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Abstract The Northern Expedition (1926-28) was a turning-point in the rise to power of the Nation-
alist Party in China, and instrumental in Chiang Kai-shek’s own meteoric rise from the position of 
military commander to top political leader. Scholars have examined the international consequences 
of this turning-point in Republican history from many angles. Most studies, however, have focussed 
on inter-state relations at the institutional level, leaving public opinion rather on the sidelines. In 
an attempt to fill this gap, this paper discusses Japanese press coverage of the Expedition, with a 
particular focus on the changing perception of Chiang’s role in the Nationalist Party. The analysis 
brings to light the articulate response of the press and of other national figures to the events in China. 
If on the one hand the Expedition gave cause for anxiety because of the threat it posed to Japanese 
interests, on the other it raised the hope that a stable government would emerge after years of civil 
war. While some commentators expressed cautious optimism, however, other observers held strong 
reservations about Nationalist leadership. Furthermore, coverage of the Jinan Incident shows that 
even the advocates of a policy of conciliation could assume a hardline stance when the Japanese 
military took the initiative on the ground. These findings suggest that further research into the early 
years of the Nanjing government could help explain why public opinion shifted rapidly in favour of 
an aggressive policy in China after the Manchurian Incident in 1931.
Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 The Spectre of Communism Looms Over National Revolution. – 3 
Towards Rupture Point: the Path from Nanchang to Shanghai. – 4 Revolution Stumbles as Factional 
Strife in the Nationalist Party Produces Warlords. – 5 Japan’s Interests in China and the Northern 
Expedition. – 6 From Jinan to Beijing: an Uncertain Scenario. – 7 Conclusion. 
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1 Introduction
The Northern Expedition of 1926-28, the military campaign which led to 
the formal reunification of China under the Nationalist Party, has been con-
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sidered in a number of studies as a turning-point in the Republican period 
(in English, recent publications are Van de Ven 2003, 94-130; Zarrow 2005, 
230-47; Taylor 2009, 52-85; the most detailed account is in Wilbur 1983). 
Debate has concentrated on the significance of the Expedition in terms of 
revolutionary movement, seen from the two opposite perspectives of the Na-
tionalist (GMD) and Communist (CCP) Parties. For the latter, the breakup of 
the United Front in 1927 was a grave setback in the fight against the forces 
of reaction. For the former, on the other hand, it represented a ‘purifica-
tion’ from deviant radicalism. From these mutually exclusive viewpoints, 
scholars have explored a wide range of Chinese and foreign sources in an 
attempt to reach a balanced assessment of the political process.
Research on Japanese documents has largely been confined to the institu-
tional sphere (for instance, see Iriye [1965] 1990, 125-59; Satō 2009, 21-71, 
224-82; diplomatic correspondence has been collected in Gaimushō 1989-
90, vols. 1-2). Only a few scholars have examined those crucial years through 
the lens of Japanese public opinion. Gotō (1987, 248-97) has analysed edi-
torials from the Ōsaka Asahi shinbun as part of an extensive study on how 
this leading newspaper closely observed the Chinese Revolution from its 
beginnings, in 1911. Eguchi (1972, 355-60) has praised the liberal magazine 
Tōyō keizai shinpō for its strong criticism of Japan’s military intervention in 
China. The official histories of the two largest newspaper companies also 
consider their coverage of the Shandong Expeditions in 1927 and 1928 (Asa-
hi shinbun 1995, vol. Taishō–Shōwa senzen hen, 299-301, 310-2; Mainichi 
shinbun 1972, 155-7; Mainichi shinbun 2002, vol. 1, 674-82). Underlying 
each of these works is an effort to present the relevant editorial line in a 
positive light, with the emphasis on the intention to establish a constructive 
Sino-Japanese dialogue. Eguchi, however, has stressed that the Tōyō keizai 
shinpō was the only voice that stood uncompromisingly against imperialism 
and militarism, while major newspapers held on to the notion of preserving 
Japan’s “special interests” in Northern China.
More recently, other researchers have dealt specifically with the issue 
of Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership. Yamada (2005, 643-53) has analysed the 
writings of journalist Tachibana Shiraki, who spent most of his professional 
life in China. Tachibana, who supported the Northern Expedition as a 
popular struggle against the warlords, criticised both the excesses of Com-
munism and the reactionary character of the Nanjing government. Soon 
disillusioned with Chiang, he dismissed him simply as a military dictator 
who had betrayed the revolutionary cause. Matsushige (2013) focuses 
on the main Japanese newspaper in Manchuria, the Manshū Nichinichi 
shinbun, showing how expatriates responded with growing apprehension 
to the Expedition. Finally, Iechika (2013) has compared press coverage 
of Chiang’s trip to Japan in the autumn of 1927 with the account left by 
Chiang himself in his diary, pointing out the difference there was between 
the public reception actually awarded him and Chiang’s expectations.
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Research based on Japanese press sources has a double merit. On the 
one hand, it presents additional viewpoints which contribute to balanc-
ing our understanding of the facts. On the other, it provides essential 
information on Sino-Japanese relations beyond government level. This 
paper, which presents a survey of major newspapers and magazines, aims 
to contribute in both ways to the literature on the Northern Expedition. 
The period examined covers July 1926 to June 1928, from the start of the 
military campaign to its completion after the capture of Beijing. The two 
newspapers considered are the Ōsaka Mainichi shinbun (OM) and the 
Tōkyō Asahi shinbun (TA or simply Asahi), which were among the most 
widely read in Japan. According to police reports, at the end of Novem-
ber 1927 the Mainichi had a daily circulation of 1,166,432 copies, while 
the Asahi was selling about 400,000 copies; neither purportedly had a 
political bias (Keiho kyoku [1927] 1979, 7, 29).1 Both Mainichi and Asahi 
had a partner in the same group: the Tōkyō Nichinichi shinbun and the 
Ōsaka Asahi shinbun respectively (about 450,000 and 1,260,596 copies; 
Keiho kyoku 1979, 7, 29). It is important to point out, however, that Ni-
chinichi editorials tended to coincide with those of the Mainichi, while the 
two Asahi acted more independently. Therefore, a review of the Tokyo-
based Asahi can highlight the differences with its Osaka counterpart. The 
other sources selected are Chūō kōron and Kaizō, which were among the 
most popular general-interest magazines of that period (about 20,000 
and 100,000 copies, respectively; Keiho kyoku 1979, 21). Being special-
ised publication, Gaikō jihō is not considered here. As the main forum on 
foreign affairs, however, it will be discussed in another paper.
When dealing with press sources, the question of the extent to which ar-
ticles may be representative of public opinion in the broadest sense arises 
inevitably. Japan was at the time a nation of 61 million people, 77%  of whom 
resided in rural districts (Naikaku tōkei kyoku 1940, 5). The editorial market, 
on the other hand, catered chiefly to the urban middle class. The publica-
tions cited here, then, could hardly be said to be the ‘voice of the people’. 
Nonetheless, they do shed light on the political leanings of an important sec-
tion of Japanese society, which debated foreign affairs with a critical spirit.
The following paragraphs track press coverage of the Northern Expe-
dition in its various stages, with a focus on the changing perception of 
Chiang Kai-shek and his role in the Nationalist Party. The first section 
addresses the question of GMD-CCP cooperation in the initial phase of 
the campaign. The next traces the widening of the Left-Right split in the 
GMD in the first months of 1927, up to the start of the ‘red purge’. The 
central part then discusses later developments from the standpoint of 
1 Higher figures (1,304,262 and 575,838 copies) appear in company figures, which refer to sales 
on New Year’s Day. Mainichi shinbun 2002, Bekkan, 97; Asahi shinbun 1995, Shiryō hen, 320.
130 Revelant. Revolution Deconstructed: Chiang Kai-shek and the Northern Expedition
Chiang Kai-shek and His Time, 127-170
GMD factionalism. The final section re-examines the Expedition compre-
hensively in relation to Japan’s interests in China. The conclusion ties up 
the results of the research comparatively with those of previous studies.
2 The Spectre of Communism Looms Over National Revolution
Japanese press coverage of the Northern Expedition started in a rather 
low key. Attention was still focussed on Beijing, where control of the 
nominal government of China had recently shifted to the Fengtian clique 
as a result of the latest clash of arms between the regional factions. Po-
litical instability brought with it concern over a range of international 
issues, such as the stalemate in negotiations for the revision of Chinese 
tariffs (TA 6 July). When the GMD officially launched the Expedition in 
Canton, reporters summed up the news in a few lines (TA 7, 10 July; 
OM 11 July). Only one of these articles commented on the appointment of 
Chiang Kai-shek as commander-in-chief of the Nationalist forces. Because 
of the extensive powers which accompanied the post, the article stated, 
“the position of Mr Chiang as dictator (dokusaikan) of Canton has been 
publicly acknowledged” (TA 7 July; a similar remark in TA 3 August).
Further explanation regarding Chiang’s standing in the GMD and the 
Expedition in general, however, would soon follow as the Nationalists 
scored their first victories in Hunan. The Asahi (21 July) noted that the 
campaign against the Zhili-Fengtian coalition
is not a mere struggle for power between North and South, or military 
cliques; it is a fight between a nationalist, conservative military clique 
and a Communist Party that uses foreign power. It has to be looked at as 
a grave development in a struggle that will condition the fate of China.
Regarding the GMD leadership, in the same article the opinion was that
the Canton government has now become completely the realm of the 
Communist Party. Former chairmen of the central executive committee 
as Hu Hanmin and Wang Jingwei have lost their position one after the 
other; the last Right-wing leader, [...] Wu Tiecheng, has suddenly been 
removed, arrested and imprisoned [...]. In this way the central executive 
committee has lost half of its members and actual power in the Canton 
government has shifted to the despotic arbitrariness of Mr Chiang Kai-
shek and the supreme political advisor, Mr Borodin.2
2 For a portrait of Mikhail Borodin, see Furushō 1927.
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This editorial introduced three key themes that would later crop up again 
in discussions on the Northern Expedition, namely: the role of the Soviet 
Union as foreign power behind the GMD; factional strife within the GMD; 
and Chiang’s relationship with the Communists.
Concerning the first point, the Mainichi agreed that the Expedition was 
a Soviet-sponsored venture, which aimed to extend Communist influence 
over a vast territory. Russia, “after the failure of its Far East policy in 
Northern China [...] is injecting tremendous strength into Canton as its 
only foothold in Southern China” (10 August). This explained why, “tak-
ing the opportunity of disturbances in Hunan” (that is, Tang Shengzhi’s 
rebellion against the local warlord), Russia “has supplied large amounts 
of weapons and ammunitions and has had [...] Mr Chiang Kai-shek carry 
out the Northern Expedition, in the attempt to stretch its arm over the 
Chang Jiang region” (10 August; a more detailed discussion of Russia’s 
China policy is in TA 4 January 1927). According to this view, Moscow was 
manipulating the GMD:
It is no exaggeration to say that at present all foreign and domestic 
policies of the Canton government are based on Russia’s guidelines. 
Mr Chiang Kai-shek and others embellish this truth by claiming that 
they have allied with Russia from an international standpoint as a first 
step towards the achievement of a world revolution, and internally for 
the grand ideal of accomplishing national revolution”. (OM 10 August)
The same article concluded that, since the ultimate Russian goal was to 
“expel the powers’ influence from South China and replace it with a red 
kingdom”, the issue of GMD’s relations with the foreign powers was de-
serving of careful consideration.
Such an emphasis on Soviet dominance was toned down somewhat else-
where, by recalling that the Expedition had been a plan cherished by the 
GMD since the time of Sun Wen’s leadership (OM 12 August, 21 Novem-
ber; TA 17 August). It was the Russian advisors, in fact, who in early 1926 
had rejected as premature Chiang’s appeal to launch the Expedition. This 
had also been the mainstream position of the CCP, until Chiang staged a 
coup in Canton – the so-called 20 March Incident – that forced the Commu-
nists to re-negotiate the terms for cooperation with the GMD. Chiang had 
acted pre-emptively, spurred by the suspicion that a conspiracy was about 
to strike him. It seems, however, that these fears were only the product of a 
climate of mutual distrust (Wilbur 1983, 573-5; Van de Ven 2003, 98-104). 
At the time, the Japanese press gave credit to the story of the aborted Com-
munist coup (TA 28 March, 4 April; OM 1, 12 April; also OM 21 November, 
quoting from the GMD Right journal, the Guomindang zhoukan). Allegedly, 
the Communists wanted to get rid of Chiang because “while on the surface 
he takes the attitude of joining hands with Russia, on the other side he has 
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an anti-Communist colour” (OM 1 April). At the same time, Chiang seemed 
to behave independently from the Right-wing leaders of the GMD, whom 
he had already ousted from Canton (OM 1 April).
Gotō (1987, 247) notes that the Incident received little attention in the 
Ōsaka Asahi. This newspaper, indeed, only conjectured that the expul-
sion of “many Russians” from Canton would induce the Soviet Union to 
moderate its China policy (8 April). The Tōkyō Asahi took a closer look 
at the consequences of the coup in the GMD. Initially, it seemed that the 
purge of the radical Left had placed the “moderate faction” in a dominant 
position (3 April). Shortly after, though, it was reported that Communists 
within the party were still strong; as long as factional strife continued, a 
Northern Expedition stood no chance (19 April). Rather, there was a risk 
that Canton would fall into “a state of anarchy” (21 April). Finally, there 
came news that Chiang had managed to negotiate an agreement between 
the pro- and anti-Communist factions in the army, which would voluntarily 
dissolve their organisations (24 April).
In conclusion, at this stage, Chiang’s political leaning certainly appeared 
ambiguous. Because of his role in the repression of Right-wing leaders 
back in 1925 (as remembered in Ikeda 1927, 52; Yamamura 1927a, 42) 
and again after the renewed agreement with the CCP, journalists at times 
would portray him as a Leftist (as in OM 12 August 1926; TA 5 Janu-
ary 1927). Still, the economist Negishi Tadashi remarked that Chiang’s 
pro-Russian stand was only opportunism: he “has not turned red from his 
heart; rather, he is said to be an anti-Communist, but there is no way he 
could denounce Communism” (TA 5 January).
The tendency to associate Chiang with the Communists was in part the 
standard reaction to his appointment as commander of a Soviet-backed cam-
paign. The Mainichi, however, also pointed to some incipient reasons for fric-
tion, which would become increasingly evident in the following months. In 
the first place, the Communist Party and labour unions were not necessarily 
ready to comply with the instructions of the GMD government, as proven by 
the authorities’ recourse to an order labelling strikes as “counter-revolution-
ary” activity to stop them (OM 12 August). Although the Nationalist Army 
claimed not to be responsible for violence committed by the labour union 
corps, this sounded like a lame excuse that would hardly win the trust of 
either foreigners or the Chinese people themselves, “aside from the violent 
and the lower classes” (16 December). Hence, no matter how hard Chiang 
tried to present himself as Sun Wen’s heir, “this will be useless [...] so long 
as he does not reject Communism and break up with Communists and Rus-
sian advisors” (4 October).3 At the same time, it appeared that Chiang could 
3 As an instance of these attempts to distance themselves from the Communists, see an 
interview with Chiang in Jiujiang (TA 19 November evening). GMD member Yin Rugeng, who 
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not easily free himself of these bonds. Behind the successful advance of the 
GMD, the editor observed, there were “the young students and labourers” 
in China, and Russian support from abroad (3 September).
Whether initiative for the Expedition had come from Russia or the GMD, 
or whether Chiang was a Communist pawn or not, in the eyes of Japanese 
commentators the military campaign remained related to the threat of 
“reddening” (sekka). Quotations from the Nationalist Party Weekly in-
cluded the following passage:
the Communist Party propagandises its ideology and in the end, wherev-
er the Northern Expedition armies arrive, there arrives the influence of 
the Communist Party. Although originally it was the Nationalist Party’s 
Northern Expedition, the Communist Party has used it to gain power, 
wreaking havoc on the Nationalist Party. (OM 21 November)4
The Asahi, too, shared the view that the Expedition’s steady advance into 
the Yangzi region meant, without doubt, that “the reddening forces have 
come to control almost half of China” (30 November). The editor then 
pondered the disquieting consequences of such a situation:
The time when all of China turns red may not be far off. The reddening of 
all China is the emergence of a second Russia. Both the Canton govern-
ment and the leaders of the Northern Expedition pledge that they will 
not carry out Communism, and that they uphold the Three Principles 
of the People of Mr Sun Wen. We also do not believe that today, after 
the failure of idealistic Communism in Russia, they will try to carry out 
in China this kind of Communism. However, if we look at the political 
structure of the Canton government, in the cell organisation based on 
the proletarian masses there is no difference from the Soviet organisa-
tion of workers/peasants. [...] Should they control all of China, the point 
is whether they will keep their reiterated hard line on the abrogation of 
established treaties. [...] Although the reddening of China is China’s own 
problem, if the effects of reddening involve indiscriminate repeal of the 
established treaties, that is a vital problem for Japan. For the sake of a 
vital problem, regardless of whether the counterpart turns red or not, 
one has to assert those rights that must be asserted. 
had taken refuge in Japan during the previous war, spoke in defence of Chiang in an inter-
view to the Asahi (10 September evening). Evening editions bear the following day’s date.
4 In another article, Negishi explained how the organisation of the Revolutionary Army fol-
lowed the Soviet model and how its political sections, in charge of propaganda, were under 
Deng Yanda, “red among the reds” (TA 3 January 1927). He also wrote about the ties between 
the GMD and Leftist mass organisations of peasants and workers (TA 6, 7 January 1927).
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This view contrasts with the more positive attitude of the Ōsaka Asahi, 
which sympathised with the GMD as the only possible agent of China’s 
reunification supported by popular legitimacy (Gotō 1987, 249-52), and 
considered likely a substantial reduction of Soviet influence over the party 
in the future (Gotō 1987, 249-53).
Undeniably, the GMD had an explicit anti-imperialist goal, that is to say: 
abrogation of the unfair treaties that set limits on China’s sovereignty to the 
advantage of the foreign powers (TA 14 September). Even admitting that 
now the GMD targeted only British interests, it might soon turn its attention 
to Japan as well if the Expedition clashed with the Fengtian clique in the 
North (OM 18 September). The practical consequences of anti-imperialism 
in the context of the Expedition became clear at the start of 1927, with the 
takeover of British concessions in Hankou and Jiujiang. These events came 
as shocking news to the Japanese public. The Mainichi (7 January) called 
the occupation “a grave problem that [...] requires also the attention of our 
country”. The Asahi (12 January) stated emphatically: “As a world problem, 
at present and in the future, there is no problem as great as this”. Quite 
naturally, as discussed further below, anti-British incidents fuelled the de-
bate on how Japan should protect its own interests in China.
On these developments, Chiang took an ambiguous stand. When ad-
dressing a large Chinese audience at a welcome rally in Nanchang, he 
stressed the need to fight imperialism so as to achieve the abolition of 
extraterritoriality and the restitution of concessions (OM 15 January even-
ing). On the other hand, on a different occasion he allegedly stated that the 
Hankou concession should be given back to Britain, as occupation was the 
wrong means to that end (OM 16 January evening). As one journalist put 
it, “Chiang Kai-shek, having in mind the people’s inclinations, has tried to 
cater to their will with ingenious propaganda, by professing aloud what the 
public wants him to say” (Ikeda 1927, 50). In this respect, Chiang’s behav-
iour was similar to that of foreign minister Eugene Chen and other GMD 
officials, whose tones swung between the threatening and the reassuring. 
After interviewing the ‘top five’ men in government (Chen, Xu Qian, Song 
Ziwen, Deng Yanda and Sun Ke, in OM 4-6 January), the Mainichi reporter 
concluded (6 January) that they shared some common ideas regarding 
Japan. These were: the absolute necessity of Sino-Japanese friendship, 
based on an equal footing; the acknowledgment of Japan’s special position 
in Manchuria; and, in the long-term, an agreement for the restitution of 
Japanese concessions. Commentators, however, remained wary of concilia-
tory statements. Negishi recalled that Chiang, after the capture of Wuhan, 
had declared that “the National Government will stifle British imperialism 
in the South; the National Army will stifle Japanese imperialism in the 
North” (TA 8 January 1927). Moreover, the spread of radical movements 
in the territories occupied by the GMD reinforced doubts about the ability 
of its officials to restrain the Communists and labour unions (OM 17, 22 
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March). For these reasons, the press kept a close eye on the mounting 
factional strife within the GMD.
3 Towards Rupture Point: the Path from Nanchang to Shanghai
From the start of the Expedition, it was clear that the political situation 
in Canton was unstable (TA 17 August). Internal divisions became rife 
at the end of 1926 when Chiang, in response to the establishment of a 
Provisional Joint Council in Wuhan by Leftist leaders, summoned from 
Canton the remaining group of party officials to form a rival political cen-
tre in Nanchang. Tension between the two factions soon escalated. At the 
Third plenum of the central executive committee (CEC), held in Hankou 
on 11 March, the Left majority stripped Chiang of his key posts (the most 
detailed account is in OM 13 April). Chiang, however, simply refused to 
recognise the legitimacy of those decisions. He and his allies started to 
use armed force against the Communists, repressing demonstrations and 
coups in several cities. The violent suppression of thousands of Commu-
nists in Shanghai on 12 April marked a point of no return in the break 
from the United Front. A few days later, a new government was formed in 
Nanjing in open opposition to Wuhan.
Thus, in the first months of 1927, Japanese newspapers had a growing 
body of evidence which set Chiang apart from the GMD’s Left wing. Shortly 
before the Third plenum, the Mainichi (7 March) noted that both sides had 
their reasons to resent each other. On the one hand, the concentration of 
military and political power in Chiang’s hands was in total disregard of 
the committee system that had so far been the norm in party governance 
(on the Soviet origins of this feature, see TA 5 January 1927). On the other, 
those in Wuhan were “more radical than Chiang and others”; their abil-
ity to instigate workers and take advantage of anti-foreign incidents was 
a cause of serious concern to the Nanchang group (the former aspect is 
emphasised in TA 1 March evening). Yet, since the CCP and the GMD had 
some powerful common enemies, the editor’s prediction was that Chiang 
would not resort to a coup, as he had in March of the previous year, and 
that the GMD would not split unless Chiang struck a compromise with 
the Northern coalition. The Asahi (6 March) agreed that a formal split 
of the party was unlikely, offering a different reason: the senior officials 
had moved to Nanchang because there Chiang would protect them from 
the radical Left; as long as Chiang held military power, the Wuhan fac-
tion would not dare to act. However, in the wake of the party summit – in 
which Chiang did not even participate – the break appeared serious. Left-
ist propaganda accused the commander-in-chief of despotic behaviour, of 
conspiring in view of an agreement with the North, and of having turned 
pro-Japanese. This was nothing but an attempt “to beat down and reduce to 
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impotence Mr Chiang Kai-shek, who is a thorn in the side for the Commu-
nist faction of Wuhan”, so as to “carry out the reddening campaign as they 
wish” (OM 16 March evening). According to an anonymous GMD official, 
however, such high-handed behaviour would only hasten the explosion of 
internecine conflict (TA 16 March).
What had so emboldened the radical Left? The Mainichi (16 March 
evening) listed three causes: (Russian) financial support through Borodin; 
anti-Chiang popular sentiment in Wuhan, resulting from effective propa-
ganda; and the elimination of Chiang’s military influence in Wuhan thanks 
to the cooptation of Tang Shengzhi. One other fact (already pointed out in 
OM 16 January evening, 14 March) signalled a process that would receive 
much attention in the press: the emergence of competing military factions 
within the GMD. Tang had been one of the first local leaders to join the 
party at the start of the Expedition; several others followed, defecting 
from the enemy. Moreover, the GMD had already coopted some powerful 
warlords, such as Li Zongren from Guanxi. There were also rising party 
members who took the Expedition as an opportunity to acquire a territo-
rial base, as did Li Jishen in Guandong. Chiang himself, by advancing into 
the Lower Yangzi region, secured direct control of Chiangxi, Fujian and 
his home province of Zhejiang. Earlier, the Mainichi had already started 
to see Chiang as the leader of a “new military clique” (shingunbatsu) 
based in Nanchang (2 February). This was ironic, for one of the declared 
goals of the Expedition was precisely that of sweeping away warlordism. 
Instead, political conflict within the GMD created a fertile ground for the 
rise of military factions, old and new (24 September). Hence the comment: 
“Whenever they open their mouth, the Southerners attack the military 
cliques, but in this way they criticise the others’ defects without noticing 
their own, and rather deserve ridicule” (19 December).
The Mainichi observed that the allegiance of generals to either the 
Wuhan faction or to Nanchang/Nanjing depended more on personal con-
venience than on ideology (16 May, 16 December). In the case of Tang, 
for example, the opinion was that in the future he would abandon the 
Communists to “join with the new Beiyang faction that will emerge” (18 
March evening). Shortly after, when he appeared to switch sides, this was 
seen as a predictable reaction to Communist violence in Shanghai (TA 24 
March). Tang continued to support the Wuhan government, but in July he 
approved the occupation of the city by his subordinate commander He Jian. 
The coup led to the flight of Borodin and also of leaders of the extreme Left, 
resulting in a shift of power to the Wang Jingwei faction (OM 19 July; TA 20 
July evening). Thus, by turning to the “pink party” (that is, the moderate 
Left), Tang tried to “fulfill his year-long ambitions” (OM 21 July). In the 
following months, Tang concentrated on strengthening his hold on Hunan 
and Hubei. When the main GMD factions reached a compromise for a new 
government in Nanjing (TA 20 September), Tang took a defiant attitude 
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(TA 21 September evening; OM 22, 24 September). Accused of plotting an 
alliance with the Fengtian clique, he had to deal with a punitive expedition 
and was forced to take refuge in Japan in November.
Chiang did not target Wuhan immediately after the Third plenum, ap-
parently because his forces were still engaged in the offensive against 
Nanjing warlord Sun Chuanfang and his ally Zhang Zongchang. However, 
the Mainichi foresaw that after the capture of Nanjing and Shanghai the 
next target would be Wuhan; in the end, Chiang would prevail over the 
Left because of his superior military power (OM 16 March evening). The 
circumstances under which the Revolutionary Army took Shanghai and 
Nanjing, on 22-24 March, contributed to an escalation in the confronta-
tion between factions. In Shanghai, troops led by Bai Chongxi repressed a 
Communist-sponsored uprising; in Nanjing, Nationalist units looted and as-
saulted foreign residents, provoking a retaliatory bombardment by British 
and US warships. Reporters sent horrified accounts of violence in Nanjing, 
especially the attack on the Japanese consulate (TA 25, 26 March; OM 30 
March). Chiang protested that the looters must have been retreating en-
emy soldiers disguised as Nationalists, and gave assurance that he would 
look into the incident (TA 26 March; OM 27 March). However, the version 
prevailing overseas (see consul Morioka, in TA 29 March) was that the 
perpetrators were Communists in the GMD ranks. It was thought that the 
CCP had planned the incident with the purpose of causing Chiang trouble 
in two ways: on the one hand, they would thwart his efforts to win foreign 
support; on the other, by provoking the powers’ retaliation, they would 
rouse xenophobic feelings among the Chinese people who would turn also 
against the moderate commander (Negishi 1927, 74; Maida 1927, 78-80; 
Yoshino 1927a, 108-9).5 While the Ōsaka Asahi stressed the need to avoid 
a hardline reaction (Gotō 1987, 258-9), the Tōkyō Asahi (27 March) added 
that Chiang should promptly reform the army and punish the ringleaders. 
The Mainichi (27 March) commented that the GMD was at least morally re-
sponsible for what had happened, because it had instigated hatred against 
the foreigners; although its government officially rejected such violent 
measures, there were many Communists and other radical agitators in 
the party. The conflict, therefore, between Wuhan and Chiang’s “moderate 
faction” could not but have serious international consequences (1 April). 
In other words, dissociating himself from the Left had become for Chiang 
ever more crucial to win international recognition.
Chiang attempted a rapprochement with Wang Jingwei (TA 5 April even-
ing; OM 5 April; Yamamura 1927b, who also traces the story of their rela-
5 The thesis of a Communist conspiracy was then extended to the anti-Japanese incident 
that occurred in Hankou on 3 April (OA 5 April, in Gotō 1987, 259; OM 5 April). The Asahi 
(5 April) stressed the responsibility of the Japanese government, which had not taken ad-
equate pre-emptive measures.
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tionship in the GMD), whom the Third plenum had summoned back from 
Europe to resume the chairmanship, but failed to dissuade him from going 
to Wuhan. There, the Mainichi expected, the Communists would use Wang’s 
prestige for their own ends (17 March, 5 April). Although the Ōsaka Asahi 
still hoped that Wang might mediate so as to bring unity back to the party 
(7 April, quoted in Gotō 1987, 260-1), the following weeks saw an escalation 
of factional violence that led to Chiang’s final break with the CCP and the 
formalisation of the GMD split. Chiang’s motives seemed clear. There were 
rumours of imminent attempts on his life and on that of other members of 
his faction by the Communists in Shanghai (OM 2 April); he was concerned 
about internal order and foreign relations which he saw as “priority prob-
lems” (OM 4 April); his “moderate faction” was enraged about the effects 
of the “wild policies” of the Communist-dominated Wuhan government, 
such as relentless strikes and peasant violence (OM 10 April); and it was 
rumoured that Right-wing leaders, dissatisfied with Chiang’s tolerance of 
Communists, were planning to establish an independent regime in Guanxi 
and Guandong provinces (TA 13 April evening). Hence, the red purge in 
Shanghai came as no surprise to the press (TA 13 April). It was, rather, 
the logical result of a combination of domestic and international factors.
4 Revolution Stumbles as Factional Strife  
in the Nationalist Party Produces Warlords
Although Chiang’s coup had stopped the tide of Communism, journalists 
did not become any more optimistic about the situation in China. An edito-
rial in the Asahi (30 April), entitled “The suicide of national revolution”, 
remarked that the GMD-CCP alliance had been decisive for the success of 
the Northern Expedition (as explained also in Ikeda 1927, 51-4; Yamamu-
ra 1927a, 40-1). The premature end of the United Front, therefore, made 
the prospects of reunification of the country more difficult. Moreover, the 
Mainichi (16 May) pointed out that there were factional divisions in both 
the Wuhan and the Nanjing camps. In the former, apart from “three or 
four people” such as Xu and Deng, there were no members of the “true 
Communist faction” in top government posts; most of the higher military 
officers in the armies of Tang and Zhang Fakui were, if anything, anti-
Communist and perhaps plotting a coup. In Nanjing, on the other hand, 
there were “surprisingly many members of the Communist Party” among 
the lower officers in Chiang’s forces. In addition, both governments were 
under external threat. Wuhan faced its enemies on three sides: the Feng-
tian clique in the north, Nanjing in the east, and Canton (controlled by 
Li Jishen) in the south. Chiang, instead, had to confront both Wuhan and 
the Northern coalition. Neither branch of the GMD, then, seemed to have 
strength enough to break the stalemate.
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In Wuhan, as recalled above, the balance of forces gradually swung 
against the Communists. There had been signs of this from the onset of 
the split (OM 22, 23 May; TA 22, 24 May). Yoshino Sakuzō, the well-known 
political scientist and columnist, noted that the Communist Party was in 
China “an extremely small group” and its recent rise to power was but 
“a temporary aberration” (1927a, 110). According to the Mainichi (25 
May), the Wuhan government had lost popular support and was isolated 
because of its radical policies, which had wrecked the economy and so-
cial order. Even Moscow had no longer any interest in supporting such 
a failure.6 As he had already done with Chiang, the editor pointed out 
that the expulsion of Communists from Wuhan, besides stemming from 
personal rivalries, had become necessary from the standpoint of external 
relations (25 July). This observation referred not only to other factions 
in the GMD (29 June), but also to the international sphere. Britain had 
severed all diplomatic ties with the Wuhan government, claiming that it 
lacked the ability to enforce any agreement. This had boosted the image 
of the Nanjing faction, which was promoting itself as a reliable negotiating 
partner for the foreign powers (see, for example, Wu Chaoshu in OM 17 
May). The Mainichi, however, remained sceptical about how trustworthy 
Nanjing was (21 May). For Chūō kōron (editorial 1927c), the red purge 
in Wuhan marked the end of CCP influence: “In China the Communist 
Party is like something that flies away when it blows. We don’t know if 
one should rejoice or grieve for China; in sum, however, their power today 
does not pose a problem anymore”.
The Ōsaka Asahi (Gotō 1987, 269-71) greeted the ousting of Commu-
nists from Wuhan as the fruit of Japan’s moderate policy. The latter had 
convinced Chiang that Russia was not acting in China’s interests and 
consequently made the Wuhan faction realise that radicalism would only 
bring isolation. However, relations between the two Nationalist centres 
remained tense. Differently from the spring, Wuhan seemed now in a 
stronger position than its rival. As explained in the Asahi (26 July), financial 
recovery had been steady, and the advantage of troop numbers over Nan-
jing was clear. Chiang, instead, could trust only the armies of He Yingqin, 
Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi; the other commanders were former enemies 
on whom he could not rely. Moreover, after negotiations for a truce failed, 
Nanjing was losing ground under the counter-offensive of the Northern 
forces. As a condition for mending the split, Wuhan (especially Tang, as 
later pointed out in OM 14 August) demanded that Chiang be removed 
from power. It was hardly likely, however, that such a request could be 
accepted by the Nanjing faction (TA 26 July).
6 On this point, however, the Asahi (2 August) commented that Russia would learn from 
its mistake of supporting only one faction. Its ties with China would continue, because there 
were still many Communists both inside and outside the GMD.
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The persistence of GMD divisions caused strong concern in the Japanese 
press. According to the Mainichi (4 August), it was possible that Wuhan’s 
break with the CCP might open the path to the peaceful unification of 
China, since “for both North and South there is no need to continue fur-
ther a useless war”. This seemed to be flouting the GMD’s ambition for 
national reconstruction through eradication of the Northern warlords. In 
fact, the editor’s belief was that “the South’s national revolution belongs 
already to the past” (13 August). On this issue, the Asahi (10 August) was 
more sympathetic to the GMD:
Revolution consists in putting first the destruction of the status quo, and 
building something new over destruction. [...] The value of revolution 
lies in whether arduous construction succeeds or not. [...] Having sev-
ered its relation with the Communist Party, will the Nationalist Party be 
able to proceed straight and forward on the path of national revolution 
in accordance with the Three Principles of the People? [...] The more 
the Nationalist Party splits and struggles, the more it will disappoint the 
Chinese people, and the Communist Party might ride on that chance.
At last, on 13 August Chiang’s decision to step down for the sake of party 
unity ended the impasse. The Asahi (16 August evening) found several 
reasons to explain his ‘retirement’. Besides having suffered heavy losses 
on the Northern front, Chiang had lost key allies. The top posts in Nanjing 
had been assigned to people originally from Zhejiang, causing resentment 
among the other regional factions. In particular, it was said that Li Zongren 
and Bai had persuaded He Yingqin to side with them in pressing Chiang to 
resign. Another article (TA 17 August a), which traced Chiang’s rise and 
fall from the start of the Expedition, also indicated the concentration of 
power in the Zhejiang group as a cause of hostility against Chiang. Among 
the military, Chiang had lost most of his loyal officers from the Whampoa 
academy in battle; in the fragile coalition of commanders, it was now Li 
Zongren who held “the casting vote”. During the Expedition, Li had al-
ways been sent to the front, hence missing the opportunity to strengthen 
his own territorial base. Until recently, he had hesitated to respond to 
overtures from Wuhan, but once the latter had carried out its own red 
purge, the main obstacle to an agreement had vanished. In conclusion, 
“superficially, the split between Wuhan and Nanjing factions is a split be-
tween Communism and anti-Communism, but that is not all. Rather, it is 
not an exaggeration to say that it is chiefly a split based on feelings and 
interests” (TA 17 August).
Further considerations on both the military and the political causes of 
Chiang’s defeat led to a grim prediction about the GMD (TA 17 August 
b). Although Chiang’s exit from the scene could pave the way to formal 
reunification of the party, the revolutionary spirit had grown thin. Chiang 
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had revived the party’s Right wing (the so-called Western Hills faction) and 
made room for “bureaucratic” elements. His fall meant that the “new mili-
tary clique” would give way to the “old military cliques” that had joined the 
GMD, such as those of Tang and Li, for whom national revolution was just 
a struggle for power, and so, “until the birth of a new revolutionary force, 
aimless disorder may continue”. These concerns over the breakup of the 
GMD into military factions appeared again in the editorial of 30 August. 
The Mainichi (16 August) offered a similar, though less detailed, analysis 
of the causes of Chiang’s retreat. The overall evaluation of his character 
was that “personally, he has a passion and spirit that are unlikely in a 
Chinese, and also frankness; nevertheless, his lack of political experience 
and ability to exert control [...] have been standing out more and more”. 
Recalling that an American journalist had called Chiang “the strong man 
that China had been waiting for”, the editor could not but point at the gap 
between this kind of prediction and reality.
It is true that, compared to just the year before, Chiang had acquired 
immense visibility on the international scene. The Asahi (TA 17 August 
a) noted that all the world now knew him as China’s Kemal Pasha or Na-
poleon.7 Analogy with great leaders, past and present, became popular 
from the spring of 1927, with the completion of the campaign in the lower 
Yangzi region. Journalist Furushō Kunio (1927b, 79) wrote that “looking 
at the history of China, his rapid success has no comparison”; at the 
same time (81-2), he wondered whether Chiang would become a second 
Kemal, or instead fall into disgrace like Lev Trotsky (the same question 
is put in TA 6 March). Furushō (1927c) also sketched one of the first 
‘private’ portraits of the commander, touching on his habits and relating 
anecdotes that illustrated his virtues and defects. As noted by Matsushige 
(2013, 48-9), this interest for Chiang’s private life developed in the wake 
of his resignation as commander-in-chief, which allowed for a separation 
of the public and private spheres in the ‘massification’ of Chiang’s me-
diatic image. Representative of the new approach is a long report about 
a visit to Chiang in his home village (OM 8 September), in which the 
reporter’s stated aim was to leave aside politics and other “hard talk” to 
capture instead some “enjoyable talk” (omoshiroi hanashi). This trend 
peaked during Chiang’s trip to Japan (29 September-9 November), when 
especially the local newspapers gave the visit to Song Meiling’s mother a 
clear romantic slant – with no apparent interest in the political implica-
tions of Chiang’s imminent marriage into one of Shanghai’s prominent 
families (Iechika 2013, 75-6; see also OM 26 September). There was no 
coverage of Chiang’s private interview with premier Tanaka Giichi (for 
7 For example, in the wake of Chiang’s entrance into Shanghai, Time (4 April 1927) fea-
tured his portrait on the cover and an article entitled “Conqueror”.
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the official record, see Satō 2009, 225-7); this, however, is perfectly un-
derstandable in the light of the confidential nature of the visit.
The November issue of Chūō kōron featured a collection of short es-
says on Chiang, which together formed a kaleidoscope view of both his 
public role and moral qualities. At one extreme, was a laudatory piece by 
Yin Rugeng and at the other, a scathing critique by the Marxist economist 
Inomata Tsunao, who was a former member of the clandestine Commu-
nist Party of Japan. Inomata accused Chiang of first trying to reduce the 
GMD to a tool in the hands of the “semi-feudal bourgeois reaction” and 
then, having failed in this, of turning his back on the people to join forces 
with the military cliques and the imperialists. From a similar standpoint, 
the Marxist intellectual Yamakawa Hitoshi (1927) predicted that Chiang 
would return to power not “as the leader of national revolution”, but just 
as “one element of the old forces of warlordism”. Also on a negative note 
was the article by Socialist thinker Takabatake Motoyuki, who portrayed 
Chiang as an opportunist politician – like every other revolutionary leader 
in China. Protestant educator Shimizu Yasuzō, who had recently met Chi-
ang in Nara, criticised his authoritarian ways but also praised his effort to 
avoid in China the excesses of the Russian revolution; he judged Chiang 
superior to all the other Chinese leaders he had met. Finally, former army 
captain and ruralist thinker, Nagano Akira, traced, in a more detached 
way, Chiang’s gradual re-positioning in the GMD through the years, from 
cooperation to conflict with the Communists. As causes of his recent fall 
from office, he cited Chinese intolerance of the concentration of power 
and Chiang’s excessive favoritism for his regional fellows – another typi-
cal Chinese trait. It seemed to Nagano that the GMD was growing weak 
in revolutionary punch and becoming more like a military clique. In such 
circumstances, Chiang had taken a wise decision to temporarily leave the 
country. He still stood a chance of running for leadership, but would be 
wise to take care not to become just another warlord.
Indeed, during Chiang’s ‘vacation’ in Japan, the struggle for power in the 
GMD had continued – to the advantage of the Northern coalition (OM 28 
October). Both the Asahi (20 September, 10 October, 26 October) and the 
Mainichi (4 October) painted a pessimistic picture of the situation. Al-
though negotiations among party factions had led in mid-September to 
the formation of a new government in Nanjing, the agreement did not 
work immediately. In defiance of Nanjing, where Li Zongren had the upper 
hand, Wang reasserted the independence of Wuhan with Tang’s military 
support. Rather than face the punitive expedition, however, on 12 Novem-
ber Tang fled to Japan. The Asahi (15 November) feared that the practical 
consequence for the GMD would be just a partitioning of Tang’s territorial 
base among his opponents. In the meantime, Wang had moved to Canton 
under the protection of Zhang Fakui, who was struggling with Li Jishen 
for control of Guandong.
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It was amidst such disorder that the conditions matured for the return 
of Chiang to the political arena as a mediator. On the eve of Chiang’s ar-
rival in Shanghai (10 November), the Japanese public received news of 
his rapprochement with Wang. Chiang had supposedly written to his old 
rival that he could “not bear to stand by and watch the disarray of the 
Nationalist Party”, and that he wanted “to stand up again to rescue it”. 
In reply, Wang had agreed to start talks in Shanghai in preparation for a 
Fourth CEC plenum (OM 10 November evening; TA 10 November). Thus, 
another round of complex negotiations was set in motion (for a summary, 
see Wilbur 1983, 686-9). This time, Chiang led the field over Wang. Over 
the next weeks, Wang’s position was badly damaged by his suspected in-
volvement in two incidents: first, the coup that Zhang Fakui staged against 
Li’s forces in Canton (17 November); then, the Communist uprising that 
devastated the same city on 11-13 December, until Zhang suppressed it 
ruthlessly. On 17th of that month, Wang left for exile in France. The very 
day before the insurrection, the preparatory conference in Shanghai had 
asked Chiang to resume his post as commander-in-chief, and entrusted 
him to call the Fourth plenum, scheduled for January.
While reporting on these facts, the Asahi (29 November) noted that the 
GMD was splintering further. After Tang’s defeat, generals of the Hunan 
and Guanxi cliques were competing for control of the territories under 
the former Wuhan faction; moreover, Zhang’s coup (discussed on 22 No-
vember) had led to the establishment of a separate regime in Canton. As 
a result of intricate factional balancing, the main leaders did not oppose 
Chiang’s reinstatement as supreme commander. In practice, however, he 
could count neither on their support nor on the loyalty of their soldiers (12 
December). At first, it seemed that the shock of the Communist capture 
of Canton might help the GMD to pull together (13 December; on a more 
optimistic tone, OA 15 December, in Gotō 1987, 279). Because of Wang’s 
alleged role behind the coup, though, it would be more difficult for Chi-
ang to cooperate with his faction (14 December). In the wake of Wang’s 
departure, China’s domestic situation showed no sign of improvement: 
both the Northern military cliques and the GMD seemed “neither dead nor 
alive” (21 December). This stark view contrasts, again, with the appraisal 
of the Nationalists’ achievements that year by the Ōsaka Asahi. According 
to the editorial of 29 December (quoted in Gotō 1987, 280-1), criticism 
that the GMD had lost its revolutionary spirit was leaning towards the 
Communist interpretation of the facts. By expelling the radical elements, 
the party seemed to have found its way back to “bourgeois democracy”. 
The Mainichi, too, kept a close eye on the interplay between Chiang and 
Wang. It appeared that both wanted to force the Western Hills faction into 
the background (7 December); this could explain why Wang sponsored 
Chiang’s reappointment (12 December). However, it was expected that 
their cooperation would not last long (14 December). Chiang, it seemed, 
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“had tried to ride on two horses at the same time”, that is, Wang and the 
Western Hills group. Now, he was severing ties with the compromised 
Wang so as to re-establish his own faction (16 December).
With Tang, Wang, and soon also Zhang out of his way (Li Jishen retook 
Canton at the end of the year), Chiang moved on to regain leadership 
in the GMD. Despite the title of commander-in-chief, which he officially 
took again on 9 January, Chiang had only limited military power to back 
his authority. Hence, it was reported that Chiang and his associates were 
using their hold on fiscal resources and personal connections to buy – lit-
erally – the support of different military cliques (TA 6 January evening). 
However, as powerful generals from Guanxi, Hubei and other provinces 
formed a “new Wuhan faction”, Chiang’s position remained precarious 
(TA 6 January evening). It seemed that the near future, far from unifying 
them, would see the GMD fragmenting even further around the three main 
poles of Nanjing, Wuhan and Canton (TA 17 January). Nevertheless, the 
long-postponed Fourth plenum (13 January-3 February 1928) was a suc-
cess for Chiang, whose proposals for conservative reorganisation of the 
party won the full approval of the participants (Wilbur 1983, 697-9). Still, 
the Asahi (15 February) objected that Chiang had managed to dispel the 
influence of the Western Hills faction, but not that of either the Wuhan 
or Canton military cliques. Therefore, as long as the South was divided, 
conditions for resuming the drive on Beijing would not be right. This pre-
diction, however, proved wrong. Even without support from the Guanxi 
generals – Bai would lead reinforcements as late as May – in February, 
Chiang started preparations for a joint offensive with the armies of Feng 
Yuxiang and Yan Xishan in the North. By early June, the Nationalist flag 
was waving in Beijing.
5 Japan’s Interests in China and the Northern Expedition
Since the early battles in the summer of 1926, the Japanese press had fol-
lowed the advance of GMD forces in Southern China with some apprehen-
sion. As noted above, the campaign was perceived as a threat to Japanese 
interests because of strong Communist influence in the GMD and the 
anti-imperialist goals that were integral to the Nationalist ideology itself. 
While the red purges to some extent dispelled the fears of a radical takeo-
ver, the Northern Expedition remained a source of deep concern. It was 
towards the end of the campaign that heavy fighting broke out between 
Nationalist and Japanese troops in Jinan, the capital city of Shandong Prov-
ince. The Jinan Incident (3-11 May 1928) has been analysed in a number 
of studies (for example, Iriye [1965] 1990, 193-205; Wilbur 1983, 702-6; 
Satō 2009, 234-45; Taylor 2009, 79-83) for it left a scar on Sino-Japanese 
relations. On the one hand, it inflamed anti-Japanese sentiment in China 
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and convinced Chiang that Japan posed the greatest threat to the future of 
his country. On the other, it set a precedent for those in Japan who believed 
in military force as a means of asserting national interests on the continent. 
How did Japanese public opinion, however, react to such dramatic news? 
To put things into perspective, let us first review how the perception of 
risk evolved over the successive stages of the Northern Expedition, along 
with changes in Japan’s China policy.
At the start of the Expedition, the foreign minister in a cabinet led by the 
liberal Kenseikai party was a seasoned diplomat, Shidehara Kijurō. Since 
his appointment in 1924, Shidehara had pursued a policy of international 
détente. An important achievement in this sense had been, in 1925, the 
normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union. Japan had made overtures 
to China for the recovery of customs tariff autonomy and professed a line 
of non-intervention in domestic affairs. When Shidehara declared that 
Japan would not take sides in the dispute over tariffs between Britain and 
Canton, the Mainichi (18 September 1926) commented that this decision 
was in line with the minister’s established policy, which so far had not been 
detrimental to Japan. Nevertheless, the newspaper accused Shidehara of 
short-sightedness. Nationalist expansion would harass mainly the Brit-
ish in the Yangzi region; if war moved northward, however, Japan would 
be forced to abandon its policy of strict non-intervention. Although “the 
Fengtian Army does not have any special relation with Japan, nor does it 
receive any remarkable support”, the Canton government and Feng Yuxi-
ang would use the pretext of stopping Japanese expansionism in order to 
attack the North. These considerations logically raised the question of how 
Japan should pre-empt this menace.
For the Asahi (15 December), cooperation with Great Britain was prob-
lematic because the latter’s position in either South or North China was 
very different from that of Japan.8 Therefore, in order to defend its “vital 
interests”, Japan should “prepare autonomous measures” so as to “face 
any situation” that may arise in China. For “the near future”, it seemed 
that only the Nationalists had the potential for establishing a strong gov-
ernment. In this perspective, it would be “disadvantageous to stick to 
the anachronistic old treaties”. What was required on Japan’s side, in-
stead, was a “resolute attitude” to “solve neatly the unequal treaties”. The 
Mainichi (23 October) agreed that at present there could be no effective 
cooperation among the foreign powers and that Japan, as the country with 
the closest ties with China, should work out a new basis for bilateral rela-
tions with its neighbour. In this way, Japan would play the leading role in 
the redefinition of China’s international status, as Britain had done before 
8 On this issue, the Mainichi (7 January 1927) quoted from the New York Times the opin-
ion that Britain’s foremost goal in Asia was rather that of restraining Japanese influence.
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with Japan itself. For this strategy to succeed, however, an “absolutely 
necessary pre-condition” was that China drop its “useless and harmful 
foreign policy measures” (that is, economic boycotts and other anti-foreign 
activities). Of course, the lack of a unified government in China posed a 
major obstacle to negotiations. Should Japan deal directly with the Nation-
alists? For the Mainichi (30 November), the territorial advance of the GMD 
naturally raised the problem of diplomatic recognition. Japan, after all, 
had been the first country to acknowledge the Republic of China in 1913. 
However, there was a crucial difference: at that time the new regime had 
agreed to fulfil all previous international obligations. Although it would be 
sensible, “and maybe necessary”, to recognise a de facto regional govern-
ment, Japan would have to proceed with caution.
In the wake of the Hankou and Jiujiang Incidents in the British conces-
sions, the Mainichi (8, 10 January, 25 February, 26-28 February) collected 
the opinions of several representatives of big business regarding the situ-
ation in China. A few stressed optimistically – or cynically – that, since 
Britain was now the target of Nationalist attacks, Japanese firms would 
even benefit from this trend. The prevailing view, however, was that the 
anti-foreign tide could easily turn against Japan as well. The Asahi (19 
January) summarised in general terms two sets of opposing viewpoints: 
on the one hand, that the GMD had fallen under Communist control and 
should be stopped somehow before it invaded the rest of China; on the 
other, that “reddening” was just a passing phase and that it should not 
be too difficult to settle bilateral disputes, in light of the strong recipro-
cal interests between the two countries. The latter position substantially 
corresponded to that of the government. Minister Shidehara, in his policy 
speech at the 52nd Imperial Diet (18 January, transcribed in both OM 
and TA), reaffirmed the four tenets of Japanese diplomacy towards China, 
namely: non-interference; economic cooperation in the spirit of “coexist-
ence and co-prosperity”; sympathy and support for the just aspirations of 
the Chinese people; and the “defence with rational means” of Japan’s “le-
gitimate and important rights and interests”. While the Ōsaka Asahi fully 
agreed with this policy (Gotō 1987, 255), there were also more tepid re-
sponses in the press. The Mainichi (19 January) observed that the problem 
did not lie in policy guidelines, but in the actual management of specific 
issues and incidents. The Tōkyō Asahi (20 January), too, wondered how 
the government would turn its abstract principles into practice.
Negotiations between British and Nationalist authorities offered further 
cause for reflection. The Asahi (12 January), looking at the meek response 
of London to rampant violations of international law, read it as a sign of the 
changing times. It seemed that Britain had no choice but to follow a line 
of non-resistance, as an aggressive reaction would only worsen the situa-
tion. The Asahi, then, was concerned about the rising voice of hard-liners 
among public opinion in Britain. In order to prevent an escalation of the 
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conflict which would further destabilise China to the disadvantage of all 
parties involved, Tokyo would have to persuade London to abandon all idea 
of armed resistance in Shanghai; at the same time, it would have to urge 
the GMD to give up its “fanatic” activism for the recovery of China’s in-
ternational status. Going a step further, the Ōsaka Asahi (Gotō 1987, 254) 
also spoke in favour of gradual restitution to China of foreign concessions. 
The Mainichi (31 January) expressed similar views against the anachronis-
tic recourse to military means, stressing (28 January) that Japan had no 
reason to get entangled in hazardous British initiatives. In the following 
weeks, while Anglo-Chinese relations remained strained, the Nationalists 
seemed to respond favourably to Shidehara’s policy of appeasement. The 
press reported with cautious optimism on the quasi-official mission to 
Japan of GMD representative Dai Jitao, who strove to present his party as 
a responsible partner for international dialogue (OM 4, 13, 17 February; 
TA 18 February a, b, 26 February evening, 27 February). The April issue 
of Chūō kōron (1927a) expressed sympathy for the revolutionary cause. 
The same magazine also featured two articles by China expert Komura 
Shunsaburō, formerly an interpreter in the diplomatic service. Komura 
(1927a) urged Japan not to antagonise the GMD, especially by backing 
the Fengtian clique, because this would only push China into the arms of 
Communist Russia, thus endangering the whole world (for a similar warn-
ing by an Ōsaka Asahi journalist, see Kamio 1927, 118). Later (1927b), he 
considered several arguments in favour of either direct or indirect interfer-
ence, again in order to prove that neither, if not actually counterproduc-
tive, would serve to safeguard Japan’s interests.
However, the ever-widening fracture between Nationalist factions cast 
a shadow on the prospects for amicable relations. The Nanjing Incident, 
in addition, was a terrible blow to the image of the Revolutionary Army. As 
noted above, it also revived doubts about Chiang’s ability to enforce disci-
pline. To further complicate matters, in April 1927 a financial crisis trig-
gered a change of government in Tokyo. The new cabinet, in which retired 
army general Tanaka Giichi served at the same time as premier and foreign 
minister, was an expression of the Rikken Seiyūkai conservative party. 
Under its former president Takahashi Korekiyo (1921-25), the Seiyūkai 
had backed a policy of international cooperation and arms limitation, most 
notably at the Washington Conference held from November 1921 to Feb-
ruary 1922. Since Tanaka had taken over the presidency, however, the 
party had started to adopt more assertive policies. While in opposition, 
the Seiyūkai had voiced strong criticism of Shidehara’s weak diplomacy 
(see, for instance, OM 26 January, 5 April evening; TA 1 April a, 2 April; 
Uehara 1927). This position appealed especially to those industries and 
trading companies that had direct interests in China (TA 1 April b, 12, 20 
April). Hence, the Asahi (20 April) did not need to provide specific evidence 
to claim that the return to power of the Seiyūkai had aroused uneasiness 
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among the Chinese people. The Mainichi (24 April) worried that the cabi-
net’s “positive policy”, or “hard policy”, might lead to another disaster 
such as the Siberian expedition (the anti-Bolshevik intervention launched 
in 1918, which Tanaka had supervised as war minister in 1918-21). The ed-
itor conceded that “even if premier Tanaka cannot read the trend of times, 
he will not fail to understand that such a reckless policy cannot receive 
the support of the majority of our nation”. The editorial continued with an 
implicit warning not to defy “the strength of public opinion”, since it was 
thanks to the latter’s support for parliamentary practice that the Seiyūkai 
had been reinstated smoothly to government.9 In conclusion, Japan was 
to intervene in the Chinese crisis only by providing “moral support”, and 
diplomatic leadership for all the countries involved.
The events, however, would soon confirm that a shift in Japan’s foreign 
policy was under way. Journalist Murofuse Kōshin (1927, 113) defined this 
change as a passage from “petty bourgeois opportunism” to “armed impe-
rialism”. On 27 May, the Tanaka cabinet decided to send a small expedi-
tionary force to Shandong in order to protect the local Japanese residents. 
Although ostensibly the purpose was to prevent the re-occurence of violent 
incidents, the operation did constitute an interference in the ongoing civil 
war, as the presence of Japanese troops might deter the Nationalists from 
moving northward. Moreover, differently from the stationing of troops in 
Tianjin and Beijing, this deployment was not contemplated in any interna-
tional agreement. Although the cabinet tried to reassure the belligerent 
parties that the expedition was purely defensive and would end as soon 
as security conditions in the province allowed (the official statement was 
published in OM and TA 27 May), both the Nanjing and Beijing govern-
ments protested against this infringement of China’s sovereignty.
The Shandong Expedition proved a controversial matter for Japan. The 
main opposition party, the Rikken Minseitō (formed at the start of June 
with the merger of the Kenseikai with a party seceded from the Seiyūkai) 
expressed reservations on what it judged a premature decision, and later 
demanded the withdrawal of the troops (OM and TA 17 June, 18 July). 
For the majority of the House of Peers, too, the cabinet’s initiative was 
unnecessary and risky (TA 28 May a). The harshest criticism came from 
the so-called “proletarian parties” linked to the labour and tenant move-
ments, which formed after the enactment of universal suffrage for men 
in 1925. The Nihon Rōnōtō (Japan’s Labour-Farmer Party) denounced the 
expedition as an attempt to repeat in China the infamous Siberian inter-
vention, and exhorted the people to resist “to make Japan’s imperialists 
capitulate” (TA 28 May b). The Shakai Minshūtō (Social People’s Party), 
which called premier Tanaka “the boss of the military clique for many 
9 Komura (1927c, 77) later expressed the same concept in a more straightforward way.
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years”, claimed that the real objective of the expedition was to interfere 
with the belligerents’ strategy (TA 31 May). Both parties organised public 
rallies in protest. The reaction of the most radical party, the Rōdō Nōmintō 
(Labour-Farmer Party, which the government disbanded in March 1928 as 
part of a crackdown on Communists) is not documented in these articles. 
Chairman Ōyama Ikuo, however, referred to similar protest activities in a 
strongly-worded essay in Chūō kōron, where he called Chiang “the puppet 
of the rising urban bourgeoisie” (1927, 107). The Asahi, besides reporting 
on the reaction of political groups, interviewed some well-known person-
alities (29 May a). Apart from those aligned with the official stance of 
their party, there was independent Lower House member Ozaki Yukio. The 
veteran politician, a famous advocate of anti-militarism, voiced his alarm 
about the risk of undue interference: the army had always been partial 
to the Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin, and “the boss of the military 
clique” was now leading the cabinet. In contrast, cotton magnate Miya-
jima Kiyojirō stressed that the expedition was inevitable because previous 
incidents proved that the Revolutionary Army could not be trusted; those 
Peers who objected “should go and see China once”. In addition, the same 
newspaper (29 May b) asked the opinion of those whom the expedition 
would affect most directly, that is, the Japanese residents in Northern 
China. According to this survey, the prevailing view was that such a grave 
initiative should be avoided; in case of actual danger, it would be more 
appropriate to evacuate the expatriates from Jinan to Qingdao.
On their part, both Asahi and Mainichi were critical of the Shandong 
expedition. They raised the same objections (OM 26 May; TA 28, 29 May 
c, 1 June). First, that sending troops might produce the opposite effect 
and therefore should be considered only as a last resort in the event that 
all other means failed. The Ōsaka Asahi (Gotō 1978, 265-7) expressed the 
same opinion. Secondly, they argued that the Communists had been re-
sponsible for previous incidents, but Chiang Kai-shek had now suppressed 
them. Moreover, the Mainichi (29 May) pointed out that the risk of clashing 
with Japanese forces along the Jinan railway could prevent the Southern 
army from advancing in that direction; this would clearly represent an 
interference.10 It seemed that the military had dragged the cabinet into 
action, exposing the inconsistency of the latter’s China policy. The same 
article noted that war minister Shirakawa had already earned the hostil-
ity of the GMD while serving as commander of the Japanese forces in the 
leased territory in Manchuria. Afterwards, the Asahi repeatedly called for 
the withdrawal of troops (12 June, 28 June, 7 July, 26 August). Besides re-
iterating its arguments, the newspaper remarked that the expedition had 
10 Chūō kōron editorials (1927c, 1927d) and Yoshino (1927b, 119; 1927c, 92) put forward 
the same argument. 
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spurred widespread boycotts in China, seriously damaging Japanese busi-
ness interests. The Mainichi (27 June, 7 July), also, reported this negative 
outcome. However, at least part of the enterprises involved still supported 
the cabinet’s policy: a group of Kansai-based industries even lobbied for 
the sending of troops to Shanghai (TA 20 August), as Britain had done. The 
Asahi (26 August) commented that if the cabinet was to listen to this kind 
of request, the time for withdrawal would never come. The expedition had 
already cost four million yen: how could the Japanese people bear such a 
burden indefinitely for reasons that defied common sense? Yoshino, too, 
denounced the cabinet for its disregard of public opinion (1927c, 91-2).
In the end, it was the failure of Chiang’s summer offensive to Northern 
China that solved the problem. Since there was no more imminent dan-
ger that Shandong would become a theatre of war, on 30 August Japan 
withdrew its expeditionary force. The press observed these developments 
with relief and criticised the government for pretending that the operation 
had been a success (TA 1 September; OM 1 October). On the other hand, 
the Asahi (1 September) urged the Chinese authorities to reflect on their 
inability to guarantee security, as it was this failure which had justified 
the expedition. The Mainichi (30 August), noting that trade in Northern 
China had declined remarkably less than in regions affected by the Na-
tionalist revolution, concluded that the expedition had “not necessarily 
been a failure”.
6 From Jinan to Beijing: an Uncertain Scenario
The situation, however, turned critical when Chiang resumed the northern 
advance in the spring of 1928. As the Asahi had foreseen (19 April), at 
the end of April the Tanaka cabinet again sent troops to Qingdao. From 
there the field commander, general Fukuda, decided to proceed to Jinan, 
home to about 2000 Japanese nationals. On 2 May, in response to Chiang’s 
pledge to maintain order, Fukuda consented to clear part of the occupied 
area. The next day, however, a minor incident between the Japanese and 
the newly-arrived Nationalist troops escalated into intense fighting.11 The 
version of the facts reported by various sources since the evening, which 
the War Ministry soon confirmed (OM, TA 5 May evening), was that some 
Chinese soldiers had shot at a Japanese patrol when it had tried to stop 
them from looting in the protected area. The skirmish had attracted more 
and more Southern forces, resulting in a general attack against the Japa-
nese. The War Ministry suspected that it was a planned offensive (OM and 
11 For further discussion of press coverage of the Jinan Incident, see Tamai Kiyoshi 
kenkyūkai 2015, which was published while this volume was in preparation.
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TA 5 May evening, 5 May). Undisclosed sources from Tianjin and Beijing 
reported that “over one hundred” or “280” expatriates had been massa-
cred by the Southern army in Jinan, and sent gruesome accounts of these 
atrocities (OM and TA, 4-5 May). The news, however, was not confirmed 
by sufficiently reliable evidence. Eventually, the consular police reported 
about 14 dead and over 20 missing (OM 15 May evening), that is about as 
many as already confirmed by the War Ministry (OM 8 May).
The balance of forces in Jinan was about 5,500 men to the National-
ist’s 35,000, but Chiang had no intention of being bogged down in a con-
flict that would only jeopardise his advance northward. He reached an 
agreement for a cease-fire and left the city, soon to be followed by most 
of his troops. However, the Japanese command was not conciliatory. After 
obtaining reinforcements, Fukuda sent the Nationalists an ultimatum with 
humiliating conditions. Notwithstanding a partial acceptance of these re-
quests, the imperial army attacked. By 11 May it had driven the Chinese 
garrison out of Jinan and inflicted heavy losses; many civilians, too, died 
in the bombardment of the walled city. The expeditionary corps did not 
leave Shandong until a year later, after long diplomatic negotiations which 
on 28 March led the Chinese and Japanese governments to sign a state-
ment in which they expressed deep regret for the incident. The task of 
discussing compensation for both sides was deferred to a joint committee 
(Gaimushō 1993, vol. 3, 501-7).
The official histories of the Asahi and Mainichi (Asahi shinbun 1995, 
vol. Taishō–Shōwa senzen hen, 301-11; Mainichi shinbun 1972, 155-7; 
Mainichi shinbun 2002, vol. 1, 674-80) stress that, though they printed 
exaggerated news for some days of a massacre, these newspapers from the 
very beginning condemned the dangerous conduct of the Tanaka cabinet. 
On the other hand, however, they overlook other problematic aspects of 
the press coverage.
In the first place, both newspapers seemed to ignore the fact that on 3 
May the Nationalist official in charge of negotiating the truce and his 
staff had been brutally killed at the hands of Japanese soldiers. When the 
Nanjing government publicly denounced the fact, the Mainichi (9 May) 
only reported that in the United States this statement had been afforded 
great attention, while the Asahi (9 May evening) dismissed it as “risible” 
propaganda. Later on, the Mainichi (12 May b) deplored the Chinese habit 
of slandering Japan abroad in more general terms.
Secondly, although both Asahi (5 May) and Mainichi (5 May a, 12 May a) 
held the Tanaka cabinet politically responsible for the incident, they also 
laid the blame for the military confrontation squarely on Chinese shoulders. 
According to the former newspaper (5 May), the Southern army lacked 
discipline and a unified command. Soldiers involved in the clash, led by 
He Yaouzu, had already been the perpetrators of the Nanjing Incident. It 
could not be ruled out that behind their actions there was again “a plot of 
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Communist-linked military corps to overthrow Mr Chiang Kai-shek”. There 
were, moreover, “many banditesque elements” in the forces under Feng 
Yuxiang. In any case, this time there was plenty of evidence that the South-
ern army had acted “in an organised and planned manner”, as proven by 
the deliberate damage to the railway and the telegraph lines. Therefore, 
as noted by Gotō (1987, 290-1) with respect to the Ōsaka Asahi, the editor 
completely absolved the Japanese army of taking any undue initiative. Ini-
tially, the Mainichi (5 May a) gave no credit to the claim that the Chinese 
had planned the attack. Nevertheless, it did observe that the Nationalist 
commanders had failed to prevent the recurrence of anti-Japanese agitation 
among the lower officers; this proved, if not their bad faith, at least their lack 
of authority. Therefore, “the responsibility of Mr Chiang Kai-shek and others 
is more grave than in the Nanjing Incident”. The editor, however, changed 
his mind after receiving news that on the eve of the incident, officers had 
distributed hand grenades to the soldiers: this proved that, from the begin-
ning, the Southern army had a treacherous plan to attack the expeditionary 
force (other evidence was reported from Beijing, in OM 5 May evening and 
OM 6 May evening). Although Chiang was certainly not involved in this 
scheme, he remained guilty of lack of control over his subordinates (6 May). 
The Japanese command, too, deserved censure, as they had been so naive 
as to trust the Nationalists (5 May b; the same opinion in TA 13 May). In a 
long article in the same newspaper (11-14 May), Kyoto University profes-
sor Yano Jin’ichi repeated similar arguments. Furthermore, he defended 
the expedition as a legitimate means to protect Japan’s residents, and even 
called for the sending of more troops to Tianjin and Beijing.
Finally, over the course of the incident there was a considerable change 
in the attitude of the Mainichi towards the deployment of military force. 
At first the newspaper opposed the sending of reinforcements, as this 
would only cause further tension; although it was Japan’s right to demand 
apology and reparation, these should be obtained by diplomatic means (6 
May). Later on, however, false reports that the Nationalists had broken 
the truce sparked an outraged reaction:
At this point, the circumstances are clearly a provocation from the Chi-
nese side; there is no reason for excuse. For the honour of our army, 
this wild Southern army must be crushed with determination. [...] Until 
today, for the sake of Sino-Japanese relations we have called repeatedly 
for the adoption of peaceful means; but against the extreme affront of 
this provocation by the Chinese troops, there are no means to be taken 
other than thorough retribution. Therefore from now on whatever grave 
situation may arise, and into whatever difficult position it may lead both 
countries, the responsibility is theirs; we must not endure any more. [...] 
The violent affront done to our army must be swept away, no matter at 
what sacrifice. (9 May)
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Therefore, the claim that “our newspaper since the start opposed [the 
Shandong expedition], and tried to put a brake on the lone run of the mili-
tary” (Mainichi shinbun 2002, 1, 682) is not entirely accurate.
The Asahi, instead, maintained a cautious tone. Although the sending of 
reinforcements had become inevitable for self-defence, it was now neces-
sary to prevent an escalation; the risk was that it would trigger a chain 
of events as happened in the Siberian intervention, with far worse con-
sequences (10 May). In this perspective, the Tanaka cabinet had already 
made a grave miscalculation:
From the start we opposed the imprudent expedition; we were extremely 
dissatisfied with the ignorant, inconsistent, reckless attitude [of the 
cabinet], as if there were no diplomacy other than the expedition. [...] 
The only reason for the expedition was the protection of our residents 
on the spot, but if we consider that both residents and Imperial Army 
got into a scrape and many have been brutally killed and wounded, what 
was the purpose of the expedition? (5 May)
The editor also expressed concern that prolonging the expedition would 
not only damage Sino-Japanese relations, but also arouse the suspicion of 
foreign powers. Although public opinion abroad had been sympathetic to 
Japan during the incident, there were signs that the mood was changing 
(13 May).
In this regard, the press survey that Japanese newspapers presented 
appears inconclusive. Some of the articles cited supported the Japanese 
position (the British Morning Post and Daily News, in TA 8 May; Daily Tel-
egraph, Daily Mail and Morning Post, in OM 9 May; Daily Telegraph and 
Philadelphia Public Ledger, in OM 10 May; Herald Tribune, in TA 13 May 
evening). Others, however, were either neutral or critical of Japan (Man-
chester Guardian in TA 8 May; New York Times and New York World, in 
TA 10 May; the British magazines New Statesman, Outlook and Saturday 
Review, and the Berliner Tageblatt in TA 13 May evening; Allgemeine Zei-
tung, in OM 10 May). The Russian Pravda (in TA 13 May evening) of course 
denounced Japan’s imperialism. According to the Mainichi (15 May), on 
the whole, Chinese propaganda had failed to persuade foreign public opin-
ion because the facts were too evident. Although the American press was 
wary that Japan might use the incident as a pretext to occupy Shandong 
permanently, Washington would avoid becoming embroiled in the matter, 
since bilateral relations with Tokyo were too important. As for the British 
press, doubts about Japan’s intentions were more a reflection of the view of 
Japan as a trade rival rather than a sympathy for China. Therefore, as long 
as Japan upheld its legitimate rights, other countries would not interfere.
In Japan, though, opinions were mixed (Uchida et al. 1990, vol. 3, 30-3). 
The Mainichi hosted a round table of big business representatives, who 
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voiced support for a hard-line policy (10 May). The Chambers of Com-
merce and other business organisations also issued a joint resolution, 
which urged the cabinet to take effective measures for the protection of na-
tional interests in China (OM and TA 19 May; quoted in Eguchi 1973, 358). 
The Minseitō kept a low profile during the incident, and only on 21 June 
censured the cabinet’s incompetency with a formal resolution. The Asahi 
(22 June) found this response disappointing, as the main opposition party 
seemed unable to do much more than criticise instead of formulating a 
valid policy alternative (as already criticised in OM 27 February). As be-
fore, it was the “proletarian parties” who took the strongest stance against 
the Shandong expedition, claiming that its real aim was only to protect the 
northern military cliques and Japan’s capitalists (TA 10 May). In his column 
in Chūō kōron, Yoshino (1928a) expressed sympathy for the brave Japanese 
soldiers, but questioned the political responsibility of the cabinet, who had 
underestimated the risks involved in the expedition. He urged caution, 
stressing that no gain could come from treating China as an enemy.
In the following weeks, attention for the issues left over from the Jinan 
Incident waned as the Northern Expedition reached its final stage. Fearing 
that the Nationalist armies might penetrate Manchuria, the Tanaka cabinet 
pressed Zhang Zuolin to retreat behind the Great Wall; Chiang had already 
been warned not to cross that line (Wilbur 1983, 706-10). In this way, the 
Nationalists would win Beijing but remain outside Japan’s special sphere 
of interest. However, events took an unexpected turn. Japanese officers 
dissatisfied with Zhang had plotted his assassination; they carried out 
their plan on 4 June, by blowing up the train that was taking the Fengtian 
leader back home. Zhang Xueliang, who eventually emerged as his father’s 
successor, would soon prove unwilling to accept Japan’s tutelage.
The spectacular bombing of Zhang’s train warranted big headlines in 
the Japanese press, but the plot behind it remained long undisclosed to 
the public. Although in China there were immediate suspicions of Japanese 
involvement, the main newspapers supported the thesis that the authors 
were Nationalist agents (OM and TA 5 June evening, 5 June), as claimed by 
the War Ministry after investigation (TA 12 June evening; OM 12 June; for 
an extensive survey of Japanese press coverage of the incident and the con-
sequences for Japan’s domestic politics until the spring of 1929, see Tamai 
Kiyoshi kenkyūkai 2010). Journalists were more interested in the broader 
consequences of Zhang’s demise, which was confirmed only on 19 June, 
and in the prospects for the reunification of China under the Nationalist 
Party. It was a shared opinion that the capture of Beijing, though a major 
development, did not mean that “national revolution” had been achieved, 
even in its military stage; it was still to be seen whether the fragile coali-
tions around Chiang, Feng and Yan would stabilise or break up (TA 5, 14 
June; OM 9, 12 June). Moreover, beyond the Great Wall there was the very 
real risk of a fragmentation of power, which might lead to disorder, with 
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grave consequences for Japan’s security (TA 8 June). The Asahi, neverthe-
less, reached an overall conclusion that left room for optimism. Although 
the new government in Nanjing was the product of compromise between 
different factions, this alliance had more solid foundations than those of 
past regimes in Beijing; it was unlikely that in the near future internal 
strife would put it at risk. Without doubt, “The reason for the existence 
of the Nanjing government and its significance are that it represents the 
popular will, and receives the people’s support” (26 June). 
Therefore, willingly or otherwise, it was time to rethink Japan’s for-
eign policy, which so far had been “conceived in a dualistic way between 
Manchuria-Mongolia and the Chinese mainland”. Despite their geogra-
phy, sooner or later the Three Eastern Provinces would be assimilated 
by the mainland, politically and economically. Manchuria was “an impor-
tant ‘part’, not the ‘whole’”, in Japan’s China policy. Hence, there was 
no reason to sacrifice the whole for the sake of one part. Japan should 
strive to solve its problems in China, including Manchuria, by working 
with Nanjing as its only legitimate counterpart (26 June; see also TA 19 
June, which complained about the Tanaka cabinet’s poor diplomatic skills). 
These remarks, for once, were more outspoken than those in the Ōsaka 
Asahi (Gotō 1987, 296-301) in favour of concessions to the new regime. 
On a more tentative note, Yoshino (1928b) observed that the question of 
the future unification of Manchuria with the rest of China would depend 
on the solidity of the Nationalist government, which was still to be tested. 
He also agreed, however, that Japan needed to “revise from the founda-
tions its general approach” towards China. It was time to abandon the 
established framework, even if it meant giving up some rights, and build 
anew relationship based on “coexistence and co-prosperity”.
7 Conclusion
The press survey presented in this paper suggests that in Japan the pre-
vailing public perception of the Northern Expedition evolved over three 
phases. In the first, the rapid advance of the Nationalist armies across 
the Yangzi region was associated with the threat of Communist expan-
sion across China, as observed in the spread of radical movements and 
anti-foreign incidents. There were mixed judgements concerning Chiang 
Kai-shek and other GMD leaders, depending on how close to the Commu-
nists they seemed to stand. The breakup of the United Front in the spring 
of 1927, which marked the start of the second phase, led to a positive re-
evaluation of Chiang’s leadership. Opinions regarding the GMD, neverthe-
less, remained charged with criticism for its factional divisions, which were 
dragging the party into a process of ‘warlordisation’. In the last phase, 
the campaign that led to the capture of Beijing stirred ambivalent feelings 
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towards the Nationalist government. On the one hand, there was hope for 
a return of stability in China after many years of civil war. On the other, 
besides persisting scepticism regarding the GMD’s potential to achieve 
this goal, there was concern for the future of Sino-Japanese relations un-
der the new regime. While the Jinan Incident again sparked doubts about 
Chiang’s ability to exert control over his troops and eradicate Communist 
infiltration, the Nationalist advance to the borders of Manchuria brought 
to the forefront the issue of Japan’s “special interests” in China, which 
remained an open question.
Although this progression of the debate basically matches the findings 
of Matsushige (2013), sources examined here show that responses to the 
Northern Expedition were more articulate. Matsushige (54) focuses on the 
sense of threat to national interests that prevailed after the Jinan Incident, 
and claims that expectations for government protection paved the way for 
popular endorsement of the occupation of Manchuria. The mainstream 
press, however, was still far from supporting a military solution to inter-
national problems; even its judgement of Tanaka’s “positive policy” was 
severe. There was a significant difference, nevertheless, between the at-
titude of the two Asahi and the Mainichi. The former, while acknowledging 
the many shortcomings of the Nationalist Party, saw no viable alternative 
for the stabilisation of China, and stressed the need for sound dialogue 
between Nanjing and Tokyo in the interests of both countries. Although 
the Ōsaka Asahi was usually more forward-looking than its Tokyo partner, 
in the end the two reached similar conclusions.
The Mainichi, on the other hand, developed a pessimistic view of Na-
tionalist leadership, which seemed bound to become just another incar-
nation of warlordism. Moreover, if only briefly, it shifted from a moderate 
to a hard-line stance during the fighting in Jinan. That the same incident 
exposed the weakness of both Asahi and Mainichi in reacting to the ma-
nipulation of news by the Japanese military – as again after the killing of 
Zhang Zuolin, should not, however, be underestimated. Still, this does not 
mean that an insufficient screening of sources would necessarily lead to 
unconditional support for the invasion of Manchuria a few years later. It 
is also important to note that in the 1920s censorship in Japan was leni-
ent enough to give holders of opinions that were marginal on the political 
scene a hearing, for instance those who sympathised with the GMD Left 
and even with the CCP. Although little represented in the leading news-
papers, these views found considerable space in progressive magazines, 
such as Chūō kōron and Kaizō.
In conclusion, press coverage of the Northern Expedition testifies to 
the diversity of Japanese public opinion in that period. While reasons for 
conflict with China were already looming, there was no widespread belief 
that a violent confrontation was either imminent or inevitable. Therefore, 
further research should ascertain whether the shift of public opinion to-
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wards support for an aggressive policy, as seen following the outbreak of 
the Manchurian Incident in September 1931, was grounded in a changing 
perception of China in the early years of Nationalist rule.
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Newspapers
For brevity, only editorials (Ed.) and other opinion pieces are listed here.
Ōsaka Mainichi shinbun 大阪毎日新聞
1926
12 April. “Kita to minami no kū-detā: saikin no Shina no keisei” 北と南のク
・ーデター　最近の支那の形勢 (Coups d’État in the North and South: China’s 
Recent Situation).
11 August evening. “Kanton o fumidai toshite minami Shina ni sekka 
ōkoku o juritsu sen to suru Roshia” 広東を踏台として南支那に赤化王国を樹立
せんとするロシア (Using Canton as Base, Russia Attempts to Establish a 
Red Kingdom in Southern China).
12 August. Ed. “Shina gunbatsu no naikan: hokubatsugun no naiyō” 支那
軍閥の内患　北伐軍の内容 (The Internal Troubles of the Chinese Military 
Cliques: The Substance of the Northern Expedition Army).
3 September. Ed. “Bushō kanraku: eikyō wa dai naran” 武昌陥落　影響は大
ならん (The Fall of Wuchang: Consequences May Be Big).
18 September. Ed. “TaiShi fukanshōshugi no kongo” 対支不干渉主義の今後 
(The Future of Non-Intervention Policy in China).
4 October. Ed. “Kanton gun no tachiba: shōhai tomo ni tanan” 広東軍の立
場　勝敗共に多難 (The Stance of the Canton Army: Many Difficulties in 
Either Victory or Defeat).
23 October. Ed. “Shina no taido: jōyaku kaitei ni atari” 支那の態度　条約改
訂に当り (China’s Attitude: On Treaty Revision).
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21 November. Ed. “Kanton ha no hōnichishi: iu tokoro wa nani ka” 広東
派の訪日使　いふ所は何 か(The Canton Faction’s Envoys to Japan: What 
Will They Say?).
30 November. Ed. “Kanton seifu shōnin subeki ya: taigaiteki shingi ikan” 
広東政府承認すべきや　対外的信義如何 (Should the Canton Government Be 
Recognised? Is It Reliable in Foreign Relations?).
16 December. Ed. “Chō shi no nyūkyō: waga kokumin no yōkyū” 張氏
の入京　我国民の要求 (Mr Zhang’s Arrival in the Capital: Our People’s 
Demands).
1927
7 January. Ed. “Kanton gun no haigai: giwadan jiken o omou” 広東軍の排外
　義和団事件を想う (Xenophobia in the Canton Army: Remembering the 
Boxer Incident).
16 January evening. “Kanton seifu no uchiarasoi: hidari, migi ryōha no 
niramiai” 広東政府の内輪争ひ　左、右両派のにらみ合い (Internecine Conflict 
in the Canton Government: Left and Right Factions Stare at Each Oth-
er).
18 January. Ed. “Dōdō taru waga taiShi hōshin: gaishō enzetsu hyō” 堂々 た
る我が対支方針　外相演説評 (Our Grand Policy Towards China: A Comment 
on the Foreign Minister’s Speech).
28 January. Ed. “Eikoku no kyōdō shuppei teigi: kyozetsu wa tōzen” 英
国の共同出兵提議　拒絶は当然 (Britain’s Proposal for a Joint Expedition: 
Refusal Is Obvious).
31 January. Ed. “Eikoku taiShi gaikō no ranchōshi: rekkoku kyōdō no 
hakai” 英国対支外交の乱調子　列国共同の破壊 (Britain’s China Policy in Dis-
array: The Collapse of Coordination Among the Powers).
2 February. “Ankoku gun to Kantongun: ichibu de dakyō undō” 安国軍と広東
軍　一部で妥協運動 (National Security Army and Canton Army: A Partial 
Movement for Compromise).
4 February. Ed. “Eikoku no shippai to rekkoku no tachiba” 英国の失敗と列
国の立場 (Britain’s Failure and the Powers’ Stance).
7 March. Ed. “Kokumintō no naikō: bunretsu kuru ka” 国民党の内訌　分裂
来るか (Discord within the Nationalist Party: Is a Split Coming?).
16 March evening. “Ima no tokoro kyōsanha ga zettaitekini yūsei: te 
mo ashi mo denu Shō ha” 今の所共産派が絶対的に優勢　手も足も出ぬ蒋派 (At 
the Moment the Communist Faction Has an Overwhelming Advantage: 
Chiang’s Faction Is Powerless).
Chiang Kai-shek and His Time, 127-170
Revelant. Revolution Deconstructed: Chiang Kai-shek and the Northern Expedition 161
17 March. Ed. “Shina jikyoku to taiShi kigyō: mukeikai ni sugiru na” 支那
時局と対支企業　無警戒に過ぎるな (The Situation in China and China-based 
Companies: Don’t Be Too Guardless).
18 March evening. “Shō Kaiseki shi no kenryoku hakudatsu” 蒋介石氏の権
力剥奪 (Mr Chiang Kai-shek Stripped of Power).
22 March. Ed. “Kokumingun no Shanhai senryō: kongo no taigai kankei” 
国民軍の上海占領　今後の対外関係 (The Occupation of Shanghai by the Na-
tionalist Army: Foreign Relations Hereafter).
27 March Ed. “Nankin jiken: waga kuni no tachiba” 南京事件　我国の立場 
(The Nanjing Incident: Our Country’s Stance).
1 April. Ed. “Kokumingun no naikō ni tsuite: rekkoku to waga kuni” 国民
軍の内訌に就いて　列国と我国 (About Discord in the Nationalist Army: The 
Powers and Our Country).
5 April. Ed. “Kankō bōkō jiken: Nintai dekinai” 漢口暴行事件　忍耐出来ない 
(The Hankou Assault Incident: It Cannot Be Endured).
9 April. Matsumoto Sōkichi 松本鎗吉. “Kakumei Shina no chūshin e (3): 
Nanpō no nairin kenka” 革命支那の中心へ　南方の内輪喧嘩 (To the Core of 
Revolutionary China: Internecine Struggle in the South).
10 April. Matsumoto Sōkichi. “Kakumei Shina no chūshin e (4): Bukan 
kyōsanha no gyōjō” 武漢共産派の行状 (The Demeanor of the Wuhan Com-
munist Faction).
14 April. Matsumoto Sōkichi. “Kakumei Shina no chūshin e (7): Shō shi 
no seiryoku shittsui” 蒋氏の勢力失墜 (Mr Chiang’s Loss of Power).
24 April. Ed. “Shin naikaku no taiShi seisaku: shuppatsu o ayamaru na” 
新内閣の対支政策　出発を誤るな (The New Cabinet’s China Policy: Don’t 
Get the Start Wrong).
16 May. Ed. “Shina no kyokumen sarani konton: ‘kyōsan’ to ‘hikyōsan’” 
支那の局面さらに混沌　「共産」と「非共産」 (The Situation in China Gets Fur-
ther Confused: ‘Communists’ and ‘Anti-Communists’).
21 May. Ed. “Eikoku no Bukan seifu zetsuen” 英国の武漢政府絶縁 (Britain’s 
Break with the Wuhan Government).
25 May. Ed. “Bukan ha no unmei: RoShi kankei ichidanraku ka” 武漢派の運
命　露支関係一段落か (The Fate of the Wuhan Government: A Settlement 
in Russia-China Relations?).
26 May. Ed. “Waga kuni iyoiyo shuppei ka: nao kōryo no yochi ari” 我国
愈出兵か　尚考慮の余地あり (Our Country on the Verge of an Expedition? 
There Is Still Room for Reflection).
29 May. Ed. “Futatabi Shina shuppei ni tsuite” 再び支那出兵について (Again 
on the China Expedition).
27 June. Ed. “Waga shuppei no daika: Shanhai no boikotto” 我出兵の代価 
上海のボイコット (The Price of Our Expedition: Boycotts in Shanghai).
29 June. “Bukan seifu: akairo wa usureta ga nao sakan” 武漢政府　赤色は
薄れたがなほ盛ん (The Wuhan Government: Red Colour Has Grown Thin 
But It’s Still Thriving).
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7 July. Ed. “Sainan hahei” 済南派兵 (The Dispatch of Troops to Jinan).
19 July. “Bukan de kūdetā: Ka Ken shi jūyō chiten senryō” 武漢でクーデター
　何鍵氏重要地点を占領 (Coup d’état in Wuhan: Mr He Jian Occupies Key 
Points).
21 July. “Bukan seifu tsuini bunretsu” 武漢政府遂に分裂 (The Wuhan Gov-
ernment Finally Splits).
25 July. Ed. “Shina no bunkai sayō: Bukan ha no bunretsu” 支那の分解作用
　武漢派の分裂 (The Dissolution of China: The Wuhan Faction’s Split).
4 August. Ed. “Shina no heisō: heiwa wa koranu” 支那の兵争　平和は来らぬ 
(Military Conflict in China: Peace Is Not Coming).
13 August. Ed. “Kokumin kakumei no shūen: Borojin shi no haiin” 国民革
命の終焉　ボロヂン氏の敗因 (The End of National Revolution: The Causes 
of Mr Borodin’s Defeat).
16 August. Ed. “Shōshi no intai: Bukan Nankin ha dakyō no gisei” 蒋氏の
引退　武漢南京派妥協の犠牲 (Mr Chiang’s Retirement: A Victim of Com-
promise between Wuhan and Nanjing Factions).
30 August. Ed. “Santō teppei no gi: kore mata tōzen” 山東撤兵の議　これ亦当
然 (The Opinion for the Withdrawal of Troops: It Is with Good Reason).
22 September. “Nankin seifu no nayami: Tō Seichi shi Bukan ni tachiko-
moru” 南京政府の悩み　唐生智氏武漢に立籠る (The Worries of the Nanjing 
Government: Mr Tang Shengzhi Shuts Himself in Wuhan).
24 September. Ed. “Shin Nankin seifu: sono shōrai ikan” 新南京政府　その
将来如何 (The New Nanjing Government: What Future?).
1 October. Ed. “Handō jidai rai: gen naikaku gaikō” 反動時代来　現内閣の
外交 (Coming of the Reactionary Age: The Present Cabinet’s Foreign 
Policy).
4 October. Ed. “Mata ugokidaseru Shina no keisei” 又動き出せる支那の形勢 
(China’s Situation Can Move On Again).
28 October. Ed. “Kateru Hōten gun: Chō shi no chii” 勝てる奉天軍　張氏の
地位 (The Fengtian Army May Win: Mr Zhang’s Position).
7 December. “Kokumintō zentai kaigi wa jijitsujō ketsuretsu shita” 国民
党全体会議は事実上決裂した (The Nationalist Party General Congress Has 
Actually Fallen Apart).
12 December. “Shō shi no deyō hitotsu” 蒋氏の出様一つ (Mr Chiang’s At-
titude Is One).
14 December. Ed. “Kanton no bōdō to kyōsantō” 広東の暴動と共産党 (The 
Canton Insurrection and the Communist Party).
16 December. Ed. “NanShi tōitsu nan: jijō iyoiyo fukuzatsu” 南支統一難　
事情愈複雑 (Unification of South China Is Difficult: The Situation Gets 
Complicated).
19 December. Ed. “Nanboku bunritsu no dairiyū shōmetsu: tōitsu no 
shinkikai” 南北分立の大理由消滅　統一の新機械 (The Big Reason for the 
North-South Split Has Disappeared: A New Chance for Unification).
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29 December. Ed. “Shina wa doko e iku: naisō ni toshi kureru” 支那は何処へ
行く　内争に年暮る (Where Is China Going? The Year Closes on Civil War).
1928
27 February. Ed. “TaiShi seisaku no teiton: mui no tōkyokusha musaku 
no hantaitō” 対支政策の停頓　無為の当局者　無策の反対党 (China Policy at 
a Standstill: Idle Government, Clueless Opposition).
5 May a. Ed. “Nisshi hei no shōtotsu: Shina gawa no sekinin jūdai” 日支兵
の衝突　支那側の責任重大 (Clash of Japanese and Chinese Soldiers: Grave 
Responsibility on China’s Side). 
5 May b. Ed. “Shuppei mokuteki no bōkyaku” 出兵目的の忘却 (Expedition’s 
Purpose in Oblivion).
6 May. Ed. “Sainan jiken zengo: saizen no doryoku o yō su” 済南事件善
後　最善の努力を要す (Settlement of the Jinan Incident: Utmost Effort 
Required).
9 May. Ed. “Waga gun ni taisuru chōsen: tetteiteki yōchō o kise” 我軍に
対する挑戦　徹底的膺懲を期せ (A Challenge to Our Army: Go for Thorough 
Punishment).
11-14 May. Yano Jin’ichi 矢野仁一. “Sainan jiken no ikkōsatsu” 済南事件の一
考察 (Considerations on the Jinan Incident).
12 May a. Ed. “Soku ni sennin gaishō o oke” 即に専任外相を置 (Appoint Im-
mediately a Full-Time Foreign Minister!).
12 May b. Ed. “Shina no gyaku senden: keikai o yō su” 支那の逆宣伝　警戒
を要す (China’s Counter-Propaganda: Caution Required).
15 May. Ed. “Sainan jiken no taigai hankyō” 済南事件の対外反響 (Foreign 
Responses to the Jinan Incident).
9 June. Ed. “Shina kakumei undō no zento” 支那革命運動の前途 (The Outlook 
for China’s Revolutionary Movement).
12 June. Ed. “Shō Kaisekishi no shintai: ken ni nite obietaru mono ka”蒋
介石氏の進退　賢に似て怯たるものか (Mr Chiang Kai-shek’s Course of Action: 
Looks Smart But Is He Scared?).
Tōkyō Asahi shinbun 東京朝日新聞
1926
3 April. “Kanton wa shibaraku onkenha no tenka” 広東派暫く穏健派の天下 
(For the Time Being Canton Is the Realm of the Moderate Faction).
19 April. “Kanton wa izen sakeiha yūsei” 広東は依然左傾派優勢 (In Canton 
the Leftist Faction Still Prevails).
21 April. “Kanton no ryōha antō o tsuzuku” 広東の両派暗闘を続く (Secret 
Feud between Factions in Canton Continues).
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6 July. Ed. “Kanzei kaigi no chūzetsu” 関税会議の中絶 (Interruption of the 
Tariff Conference).
21 July. Ed. “Shina jikyoku no jūdaisei” 支那時局の重大性 (The Gravity of 
the Situation in China).
17 August. Ed. “Shina gunbatsu no sansukumi” 支那軍閥の三すくみ (A Three-
Way Deadlock for China’s Military Cliques).
14 September. Ed. “Kakumei seiryoku no shinten” 革命勢力の進展 (The 
Advance of the Revolutionary Forces).
30 November. Ed. “Shina sekka no taisei” 支那赤化の大勢 (The Trend for 
China’s Reddening).
15 December. Ed. “Shina jikyoku to Nihon” 支那時局と日本 (China’s Situa-
tion and Japan).
1927
3-8 January. Negishi Tadashi 根岸佶. “Hokubatsugun to sekka” 北伐軍と赤
化 (The Northern Expedition Army and Reddening).
12 January. Ed. “Kyōkōna Shina no taigai taido” 強硬な支那の対外態度 (The 
Foreign Policy Attitude of Hard-Line China).
19 January. “Kokumin seifu to wa nanzo ya: kōsubeki ka haisubeki ka” 国民
政府とは何ぞや　興すべきか排すべきか (What Is the Nationalist Government? 
Should It Be Supported, or Should It Be Rejected?).
20 January. Ed. “Shina mondai no kongo” 支那問題の今後 (The China Ques-
tion Hereafter).
27 February. Ed. “Nanpō Shina no shisetsu: Tai shi kitaru” 南方支那の使節
　戴氏来たる (Southern China’s Envoy: Mr Dai Has Come).
1 March evening. “Yōyaku rokotsu to natta kokumin seifu no nairin ken-
ka” 漸く露骨となった国民政府の内輪喧嘩 (Internecine Struggle in the Nation-
alist Government Has Finally Become Plain).
6 March. Ed. “Nanpō chūshin seiryoku no dōyō” 南方中心勢力の動揺 (Trem-
bling at the Core of Southern Power).
16 March. “Shō Kaiseki shi wa mattaku koritsu” 蒋介石氏は全く孤立 (Mr 
Chiang Kai-shek Completely Isolated).
24 March. “Tō shi Nanshō ha ni kishite:Kankō no keisei kyūten su” 唐氏
南昌派に帰して　漢口の形勢急転す (Mr Tang Returning to the Nanchang 
Faction: Reversal of Forces in Hankou).
27 March. Ed. “Nankin jiken no kaiketsu” 南京事件の解決 (Solution of the 
Nanjing Incident).
5 April. Ed. “Kankō no bōdō: Nihon seifu no sekinin” 漢口の暴動　日本政府
の責任 (Violence in Hankou: The Responsibility of Japan’s Government).
13 April. Ed. “Shō shi no kūdetā” 蒋氏のクーデター (Mr Chiang’s Coup d’État).
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30 April. Ed. “Kokumin kakumei no jisatsu: kongo no kōsei ikan” 国民革
命の自殺　今後の更生如何 (The Suicide of Nationalist Revolution: Shall 
There Be a Rebirth?).
24 May. Ed. “Shina jikyoku no henka: kyōsan ha to Hōten ha” 支那時局の変
化　共産派と奉天派 (Changes in China’s Situation: The Communist Faction 
and the Fengtian Faction).
28 May. Ed. “Tai Shi shuppei mondai” 対支出兵問題 (The Issue of the Ex-
pedition to China).
29 May a. “Santō shuppei o hyō su” 山東出兵を評す (A Comment on the 
Shandong Expedition).
29 May b. “Santō shuppei wa igi jūdai” 山東出兵は意義重大 (The Shandong 
Expedition Has Grave Meaning).
29 May c. Ed. “Santō shuppei kettei” 山東出兵決定 (Shandong Expedition 
Decided).
1 June. Ed. “Naisei fukanshō no gensoku” 内政不干渉の原則 (The Principle 
of Non-Intervention).
12 June. Ed. “Shuppei tachiōjō” 出兵立往生 (The Expedition Is Stranding).
28 June. Ed. “Tōhō kaigi ni nozomu” 東方会議に望む (We Have Expectations 
from the Eastern Conference).
7 July. Ed. “Santō shuppei mondai: iyoiyo fukami ni hairu” 山東出兵問題　い
よいよ深味に入る (The Shandong Expedition Problem: It’s Getting Deep).
26 July. Ed. “Nankin ha to Bukan ha: chōteisetsu no kakuhi” 南京派と武漢
派　調停説の確否 (Nanjing Faction and Wuhan Faction: Reliability of the 
Conciliation Theory).
2 August. Ed. “Kokumin kakumei to Roshia” 国民革命とロシア (Nationalist 
Revolution and Russia).
10 August. Ed. “Kokumin kakumei no nanten” 国民革命の難点 (The Difficult 
Point of Nationalist Revolution).
16 August evening. “Shō shi shikkyaku no shin’in” 蒋氏失脚の真因 (The True 
Causes of Mr Chiang’s Disgrace).
17 August a. “Shō shi no botsuraku” 蒋氏の没落 (The Downfall of Mr Chi-
ang).
17 August b. Ed. “Kakumei seikyoku no gyakuten: Shō shi no geya” 革命政
局の逆転　蒋氏の下野 (A Reversal in Revolutionary Politics: Mr Chiang’s 
Retirement).
26 August. Ed. “Teppei wa hatashite itsu ka” 撤兵は果たして何時か (When 
Shall Withdrawal Come?).
30 August. Ed. “Shina jikyoku to Nanpō ha” 支那時局と南方派 (China’s Situ-
ation and the Southern Faction).
1 September. Ed. “Santō teppei o yorokobu” 山東撤兵を喜ぶ (We Rejoice at 
the Withdrawal from Shandong).
20 September. Ed. “Kokumintō no danketsu” 国民党の団結 (Union in the 
Nationalist Party).
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10 October. Ed. “Nanboku no jikyoku: Kokumintō no kiki” 南北の時局　
国民党の危機 (The North-South Situation: The Crisis of the Nationalist 
Party).
26 October. Ed. “Nanpō ha no tōsō” 南方派の闘争 (Struggle in the Southern 
Faction).
15 November. Ed. “Tō Seichi shi no botsuraku” 唐生智氏の没 落(The Down-
fall of Mr Tang Shengzhi).
22 November. Ed. “Kanton no kūdetā: Kokumintō gōdōnan” 広東のクーデタ
ー　国民党合同難 (Coup d’État in Canton: Union of the Nationalist Party 
Difficult).
29 November. Ed. “Shina jikyoku no chūshin” 支那の時局の中心 (The Core 
of the Situation in China).
12 December. “Shō shi no fukushoku wa kaette zento o sugiru” 蒋氏の復
職はかへつて前途を過る (Mr Chiang’s Restoration in Office Exceeds the 
Prospects).
13 December. Ed. “Kanton no saiseihen” 広東の再政変 (Another Political 
Crisis in Canton).
14 December. “Shō, Ō ryōkyotō bunri no keisei” 蒋、汪両巨頭分離の形勢(Sep-
aration of the two Leaders, Chiang and Wang).
21 December. “RoShi no kankei danzetsu: fukasoku no jikyoku” 露支の関係
断絶　不可測の時局 (Severance of Russia-China Relations: An Unpredict-
able Situation).
1928
6 January evening. “Shin Bukan ha nari: taisei Shō shi ni furi” 新武漢派な
り　大勢蒋氏に不理 (The New Wuhan Faction Is There: Trend Unfavour-
able to Mr Chiang).
17 January. Ed. “Shō shi saiki no kōka” 蒋氏再起の効果 (The Effects of Mr 
Chiang’s Return).
15 February. Ed. “Shina nanboku no keisei” 支那南北の形勢 (The Prospects 
in South and North China).
19 April. Ed. “Santō keisei no kikyū: saishuppei fuka” 山東形勢の危急　再
出兵は不可 (Shandong’s Dire Situation: Another Expedition Impossible).
5 May. Ed. “Nisshi ryōgun no shōtotsu” 日支両軍の衝突 (The Clash between 
the Japanese and Chinese Armies).
10 May. Ed. “Jitai no jūdaika” 事態の重大化 (Worsening of the Situation).
13 May. Ed. “Kokugai shoron ni kangamiyo” 国外の所論に鑑みよ (Bear in 
Mind the Foreign Opinion).
5 June. Ed. “Shinseimen no dakai ikan: Chō shi sōnan to Tōsanshō” 新生
面の打開如何　張氏遭難と東三省 (How to Break the Deadlock? Mr Zhang’s 
Disaster and the Three Eastern Provinces).
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8 June. Ed. “Bakudan jiken no eikyō: jitai kyokudo ni jūtaika” 爆弾事件の
影響　事態極度に重体化 (The Consequences of the Bomb Incident: The 
Situation Has Become Extremely Grave).
14 June. Ed. “Shina jikyoku no tenbō” 支那時局の展望 (The Outlook for 
China’s Situation).
19 June. Ed. “TaiShi gaikō no kekkan: Sainan jiken o kaiketsu seyo” 対支
外交の欠陥　済南事件を解決せよ (The Shortcomings of Diplomacy towards 
China: Do Solve the Jinan Incident).
22 June. Ed. “Minseitō no taiShi ketsugi” 民政党の対支決議 (Minseitō’s Reso-
lution on China).
26 June. Ed. “Nankin seifu no shōnin mondai” 南京政府の承認問題 (The Issue 
of Recognition of the Nanjing Government).
Ōsaka Asahi shinbun 大阪朝日新聞
1926
8 April. Ed. “Roshiya no taiShi seisaku: hatashite itten ka” ロシヤの対支政
策　果たして一転か (Russia’s China Policy: A Turnabout?).
1927
7 April. Ed. “Jūdai jiki: Shina sarani midaren” 重大危機　支那更に乱れん (A 
Grave Crisis: China Plunges into Further Disorder).
21 July. Ed. “Innin gaikō no shōri: Kyōsantō taijō su” 隠忍外交の勝利　共産党
退場す (Victory for the Diplomacy of Endurance: The Communist Party 
Leaves the Stage).
15 December. Ed. “Kanton no kyōsan bōdō: Kokumintō bunretsu no sho-
san” 広東の共産暴動国民党分裂の所産 (The Communist Uprising in Canton: 
A Product of the Nationalist Party’s Split).
29 December. Ed. “Kotoshi no Shina” 今年の支那 (This Year’s China).
Magazines
Editorial (1927a). “Musan seitō ni kawarite Shina nanpō seifu daihyōsha 
ni tsugu” 無産政党に代りて支那南方政府代表者に告ぐ (We Speak in Place of 
the Proletarian Parties to the Representative of China’s Southern Gov-
ernment). Chūō kōron 中央公論 42, 4 (April), 2-3.
Editorial (1927b). “Nisshi ryōgoku taishū no seishinteki renkei” 日支両国大
衆の精神的連携 (The Spiritual Connection Between the Masses of Japan 
and China). Chūō kōron 42, 5 (May), 2-3.
Editorial (1927c). “Shina jikyoku no seishi” 支な時局の正視 (A Straight View 
of China’s Situation). Chūō kōron 42, 7 (July), 2-3.
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Editorial (1927d). “Seiyūkai naikaku no tai ManMō seisaiku” 政友会内閣
の対満蒙政策 (The Seiyūkai Cabinet’s Policy towards Manchuria and 
Mongolia). Chūō kōron 42, 9 (September), 2-3.
Furushō Kunio 古荘国雄 (1927a). “NanShi o ugokasu Borōjin no kaiwan” 
南支を動かすボローヂンの怪腕 (Borodin’s Amazing Ability to Move South 
China). Kaizō 改造 9, 3 (March), 1-10
Furushō Kunio 古荘国雄 (1927b). “Shō Kaiseki wa doko e iku (Kokumin 
kakumei no shōrai)” 蒋介石は何処へ行く（国民革命の将来）(Where Is Chiang 
Kai-shek Going? (The Future of Nationalist Revolution). Kaizō 9, 4 
(April), 76-83.
Furushō Kunio 古荘国雄 (1927c). “Hadaka ni shita Shō Kaiseki” 裸にした蒋
介石 (Chiang Kai-shek Naked). Chūō kōron (April), 93-101.
Ikeda Tōsen 池田桃川 (1927). “Shina no jikyoku to minshū undō” 支那の
時局と民衆運動 (China’s Situation and Popular Movements). Kaizō 9, 3 
(March), 47-56.
Inomata Tsunao 猪俣津南雄 (1927). “Hankakumei no to Shō Kaiseki” 反革命
の徒蒋介石 (The Counter-Revolution Mate, Chiang Kai). Chūō kōron 42, 11 
(November), 105-6.
Kamio Shigeru 神尾茂 (1927). “‘Shidehara gaikō’ shiren no toki”「幣原外交」
試練の時 (A Time of Trial for ‘Shidehara Diplomacy’). Chūō kōron 42, 3 
(March), 111-8.
Komura Shunsaburō 小村俊三郎 (1927a). “Chūseikiteki hōken gunbatsu to 
Soviēto shiki kakumei shinkō no Shina narabini sono kokusai kankei” 
中世期的封建軍閥とソヴィエー ト式革命進行の支那並にその国際関係 (China between 
Medieval, Feudal Military Cliques and the Advance of Soviet-Style 
Revolution, and Its International Relations). Chūō kōron 42, 1 (Janu-
ary), 148-56.
Komura Shunsaburō 小村俊三郎 (1927b). “Genka ni okeru taiShi shoiken no 
kaibō to hihan” 現下に於ける対支諸意見の解剖と批判 (A Dissection and Cri-
tique of Current Opinions on China). Chūō kōron 42, 2 (February), 114-
30.
Komura Shunsaburō 小村俊三郎 (1927c). “Tanaka naikaku to sono taiShi 
hōshin” 田中内閣とその対支方針 (The Tanaka Cabinet and Its China Policy). 
Chūō kōron 42, 6 (June), 74-82.
Maida Minoru 米田実 (1927). “Ugokiyuku Shina no kyokumen o mite” 動
き行く支那の局面を観て (Watching the Situation of Moving China). Chūō 
kōron 42, 3 (May), 77-82.
Murofuse Kōshin 室伏高信 (1927). “Mazu omae no akumu kara sameyo” 先
づお前の悪夢から醒めよ(First of All Wake Up from Your Nightmare). Chūō 
kōron 42, 10 (October), 113-20.
Nagano Akira 長野朗 (1927). “Seigi jindō ni motozuku kaiketsu” 正義人道に
基く解決 (A Solution Based on Justice and Humanity). Chūō kōron 42, 3 
(May), 58-63.
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Nagano Akira 長野朗 (1927). “Kakumeika toshite no Shō Kaiseki” 革命家
としての蒋介石 (Chiang Kai-shek As a Revolutionary). Chūō kōron 42, 11 
(November), 107-8.
Negishi Tadashi 根岸佶 (1927). “Kokumin kakumei o jōjū seshimeyo” 国民革
命を成就せしめよ (Do Accomplish Nationalist Revolution). Chūō kōron 42, 5 
(May), 70-7.
Ōyama Ikuo 大山郁夫 (1927). “Shina no musan kaikyū e no kotoba” 支那の
無産階級への言葉 (A Statement to the Proletarian Class of China). Chūō 
kōron 42, 10 (October), 107-12.
Shimizu Yasuzō 清水安三 (1927). “Jō no hito Shō Kaiseki” 情の人蒋介石 (A 
Man of Feeling, Chiang Kai-shek). Chūō kōron 42, 11 (November), 103-4.
Takabatake Motoyuki 高畠素之 (1927). “Hiiki yakusha o miru” 贔屓役者を
見る (Watch a Favourite Actor). Chūō kōron 42, 11 (November), 101-2.
Uehara Etsujirō 植原悦二郎 (1927). “Ureu beki Shina no genjō to Shide-
hara gaikō” 憂ふべき支那の現状と幣原外交 (China’s Grievous Situation and 
Shidehara Diplomacy). Chūō kōron 42, 3 (March), 105-11.
Yamakawa Hitoshi 山川均 (1927). “Shō Kaiseki wa fukkatsu suru ka?” 蒋
介石は復活するか (Shall Chiang Kai-shek Come Back?). Kaizō 9, 12 (De-
cember), 87-91.
Yamamura Tokio 山村時男 (1927a). “Kokumin seifu no jitsujō to Shō Kai-
seki oyobi sono shūi” 国民政府の実情と蒋介石及その周囲 (The Actual State 
of the Nationalist Government, Chiang Kai-shek and Their Entourage). 
Kaizō 9, 3 (March), 37-46.
Yamamura Tokio 山村時男 (1927b). “Kokumin seifu ni kaerisaki shita Ō 
Chōmei shi” 国民政府に帰り咲きした汪兆銘氏 (Wang Jingwei Back to the Na-
tionalist Government). Kaizō 9, 3 (May), 55-57.
Yin Rugeng 殷汝耕 (1927). “Tettō tetsubi seii no hito” 撤頭徹尾誠意の人 (A 
Man of the Utmost Integrity). Chūō kōron 42, 11 (November), 109-110.
Yoshino Sakuzō 吉野作造 (1927a). “Shina kinji” 支那近事 (The Recent Facts 
in China). Chūō kōron 42, 5 (May), 107-12.
Yoshino Sakuzō 吉野作造 (1927b). “Shina shuppei ni tsuite” 支那出兵に就て 
(On the Expedition to China). Chūō kōron 42, 7 (July), 118-20.
Yoshino Sakuzō 吉野作造 (1927c). “TaiShi shuppei mondai” 対支出兵問題 
(The Issue of the Expedition to China). Chūō kōron 42, 8 (August), 91-4.
Yoshino Sakuzō 吉野作造 (1928a). “TaiShi shuppei” 対支出兵 (The Expedi-
tion to China). Chūō kōron 43, 6 (June), 62-6.
Yoshino Sakuzō 吉野作造 (1928b). “Shina no keisei” 支那の形勢 (The situa-
tion in China). Chūō kōron 43, 7 (July), 79-83.

